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PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: DOES THE "SAFETY VALVE"
OF PUBLIC POLICY RENDER THEM
UNENFORCEABLE IN FOREIGN
STATES?
If a man shall steal an ox, or a sheep, and kill it, or sell it; he
shall restore five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The concepts of arbitration and punitive damages are ancient. In
Greek mythology, the giant, Briareus, arbitrated a dispute between Po-
seidon (God of the Sea) and Helios (God of the Sun) to fairly divide
Corinth.' In the third millenium B.C., when two city-states disputed
over borders, the leader of a third state made an award based on divine
inspiration.' King Solomon, the wisest king of Israel, settled a disagree-
ment between two female subjects who both claimed to be the mother of
one baby.4 And as the Biblical law above demonstrates, since time im-
memorial, tortfeasors have been punished for egregious conduct by being
required to pay damages in excess of compensation.'
Today, arbitration between citizens of foreign States requires imple-
mentation of a complicated and sophisticated system of rules and proce-
dures. Arbitration is commonly employed to resolve a myriad of
conflicts which arise between people who live under vastly different sys-
tems of law. Even more complex are the methods by which individual
States enforce foreign arbitral awards.
An American party and a foreign party may contract to resolve all
disputes in an arbitral forum. The parties may also agree that United
1. Exodus 22:1 (King James).
2. G. RAYMOND, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE STATE SYS-
TEM: AN ANALYSIS OF ARBITRATIVE SETTLEMENTS 1 (1980).
3. Id. at 9. This "first recorded case of international arbitration" occurred in Mesopota-
mia. The third city-state leader's award was revealed to him by the ancient god Enlil. Id.
4. 1 Kings 3:16-28 (King James).
5. Exodus is replete with examples of over-compensating damages as punishment:
If the theft be certainly found in his hand alive, whether it be ox, or ass, or
sheep; he shall restore double.
For all manner of trespass, whether it be for ox, for ass, for sheep, for raiment or
for any manner of lost thing, which another challengeth to be his, the cause of both
parties shall come before the judges; and whom the judges shall condemn, he shall
pay double unto his neighbour.
Exodus 22:4, 9 (King James) (emphasis in original).
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States law will govern the arbitration. This type of agreement requires
that arbitrators apply United States substantive and, in some cases, pro-
cedural law to the issues presented by the conflict.6 When United States
law governs a dispute which includes tort and contract issues, punitive
6. Two or more foreign individuals or companies, transacting international business, may
agree in advance or after a dispute arises to submit to arbitration all or some disputes arising
out of the contract. An arbitration agreement binds the parties as does any contract. Parties
usually choose the substantive law applicable to disputes and the forum at which the arbitra-
tion will take place. If the forum chosen is one party's sovereign, the arbitration procedure
may be governed by that country's rules for arbitration, where any exist. See Ehrenhaft, Effec-
tive International Commercial Arbitration, 9 LAW & POL. INT'L BUS. 1191, 1209-11 (1977).
Otherwise, the parties may submit to a more neutral forum's rules, perhaps one of the major
international arbitral forums. See infra text accompanying notes 33-38.
When formulating an award, arbitrators must follow the choices of law and forum speci-
fied in the arbitration agreement. If an arbitrator ignores the parties' choices, a national court
may review and overturn the award. See infra note 207 for a discussion of the review and
confirmation process in several foreign nations. Because the agreement binds the arbitrators,
choice of law provisions in the arbitration agreement are crucial. Depending upon the forum
and the type of dispute, choice of law provisions may preempt the parties' national rights-
both procedural and substantive.
For example, suppose an American company contracts with a British company to build a
factory in England. In some American jurisdictions, proof of bad faith in a contractual matter
may be the basis for an award of punitive damages. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct Buying Serv.,
Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984) (punitive
damages awardable for breach of contract and breach of implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in dealer's action against oil company). However, suppose the parties agree to
arbitrate any and all disagreements arising out of the contract and agree that British law gov-
erns the disputes. British law does not recognize punitive damages for bad faith. See infra text
accompanying notes 62-65 for a discussion of British actions which may involve punitive dam-
ages. Thus, the American company, by agreeing to arbitrate under British law, has relin-
quished rights and remedies available under comparable United States law.
Careful drafting may designate one or the other party's national laws, as in the example
above, or may, as happens frequently, designate a neutral foreign law as the governing law.
The laws of England, France and Switzerland are most often chosen as the neutral body of
law. W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBI-
TRATION § 17.04, at 86 (1984) [hereinafter ICC ARBITRATION]. For a discussion of drafting
to ensure the intent of the parties, see Ehrenhaft, supra at 1191-209. Failure to include a
choice of law provision in an arbitration agreement leaves the parties completely unprepared
for an arbitral outcome and complicates the arbitrators' duties. In this situation an arbitrator
must properly apply conflict of law principles to concerns of each of the jurisdictions involved
in the dispute. He or she must then determine which country's substantive laws have the most
significant relationship to the parties and their transaction. Derains, Arbitrage et Droit de la
Concurrence, 14 REVUE SUISSE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA CONCURRENCE 39, 56-57
(1982).
Under International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration (ICC Court) rules, arti-
cle 13(3), for example, in the absence of a choice of law provision by the parties, the arbitrator
"shall apply the law designated as the proper law by the rule of conflict which he deems
appropriate." INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, ICC Court Rules
[1976] 1 Y.B. COM. ARB. 158, 167. The ICC Court rules are also codified at ICC Publication
No. 291 (1975). According to one author "the arbitrators are able to infuse an international
element into the proceedings and assure both parties that the issue has not been determined by
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damages may constitute part of the arbitral award.7 To obtain redress in
the narrow application of the system of a single State, whose relation to the dispute is not
necessarily predominant." ICC ARBITRATION, supra, § 17.02, at 79.
When parties choose "United States law" to govern an international commercial contract
and arbitration agreement, arbitrators must determine which type of United States law to ap-
ply. The parties may designate the law of a specific state. If no state law is mentioned, the
arbitrators may apply the law of the state in which the transaction or breach occurred. A
party who recognizes the opportunity to collect punitive damages may suggest the law of a
state like California. California law allows arbitrators to award punitive damages. Baker v.
Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1984). For a discussion of Baker, see infra
note 67. A potential wrongdoer might prefer the more conservative New York approach set
out in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976)
under which arbitrators may not award punitive damages. For a discussion of Garrity, see
infra note 67. The arbitrators will then decide whether to apply state law or whether the
United States Arbitration Act (Federal Arbitration Act or Act) preempts state law. 9 U.S.C.
§§ 200-09 (1986). See Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821
(M.D.N.C. 1983). For a discussion of Willis, see infra text accompanying notes 89-95.
Where federal law preempts the state law, the arbitrators must make a careful choice.
Some arbitrators may apply federal common law. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,
14 (1984) (action to compel compliance with arbitration clause where arbitration would decide
franchise investment matters state law had declared nonarbitrable) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Indus., 514 F.2d 614, 616 (1st Cir.
1975) (diversity action for negligence against corporation for injuries suffered from gas which
escaped from chlorine manufacturing plant). Others may fashion the federal common law by
referring to aspects of state law which are not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. See
Keating, 465 U.S. at 15 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Comprehensive
Merchandising Catalogs, Inc. v. Madison Sales Corp., 521 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir. 1975) (corpora-
tion's diversity action against second corporation to enforce out of state default judgment); see
also Southeastern Enameling Corp. v. General Bronze Corp., 434 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1970)
(court properly granted stay pending arbitration where defendant claimed as a defense he had
only partially read contract with plaintiff and failed to notice provisions mandating that all
disputes would be submitted to arbitration and would be governed by New York law); Note,
State Law Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 MIcH. L. Rv. 1391 (1980).
7. Charles N. Brower, an arbitrator sitting on the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,
acknowledged the possibility that punitive damages might be claimed in a case where property
has been taken unlawfully and restitution is impossible. Separate Opinion of Charles N.
Brower (Mar. 27, 1986), Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co. (U.S. v. Iran), Interlocutory
Award No. 59-129-3 of Mar. 27, 1986 (Mangard, Ansari & Brower, Arbs.) 1, 25, reprinted in
MEALEY'S LITIGATION REPORTs: IRANIAN CLAIMS 3937, 3949 (Apr. 4, 1986). Brower
stated:
There are strong reasons in logic why it would be appropriate for an interna-
tional tribunal to award punitive or exemplary damages against a State in such cir-
cumstances. In the absence of such damages being awarded against an unlawfully
expropriating State, where restitution is impracticable or otherwise inadvisable, that
State is required to furnish only the same full compensation as it would need to
provide had it acted entirely lawfully. Thus, the injured party would receive nothing
additional for the enhanced wrong done it and the offending State would experience
no disincentive to repetition of unlawful conduct. If it is not deemed unseemly for
the national courts of one State to "punish" at least certain entities of a foreign State,
see U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (court award of puni-
tive damages prohibited against a foreign State "except for an agency or instrumen-
tality thereof," defined in § 1603(b) to include "a separate legal person ... which is
an organ of a foreign state"), it is questionable whether an international tribunal,
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a country which houses the tortfeasor's property, the award-holder must
present the award to that State's legal system for enforcement.' The
award must survive that foreign government's scrutiny. If it fails to pass
muster, the tortfeasor's property may be judgment proof. This Comment
is concerned with the above conundrum which confronts practitioners
involved in international business.
Contracts are not written by parties who expect an accident or a
breach. Thus, most parties do not consider punitive damages when
transacting international business. A businessperson cannot predict
whether his or her actions will lead to an arbitrator's award of punitive
damages or even how much an award might be. Yet several types of
breach of contract involve tortious acts which are punishable by punitive
damages under United States law.9 For example, a party contracting to
buy or sell goods or services may commit fraud, contract in bad faith, or
design, manufacture or service a product with gross negligence.10
Until recently, punitive damage claims were nonarbitrable under
American state and federal law.1 If awarded, they were struck down in
enforcement actions. 2 Because they believed it an abuse of artitrators'
powers to punish parties voluntarily submitting to arbitration, many
judges rejected such awards on public policy grounds. 13 Yet a change
occurred in 1985, when the United States Supreme Court, in Mitsubishi
particularly one formed by agreement of the only States Parties as to which it can
adjudicate, need be so reticent.
Id. at 25 n.35, reprinted in MEALY'S LITIGATION REPORTS: IRANIAN CLAIMS 3937, 3949
(Apr. 4, 1986).
8. For a discussion of enforcement procedures for international arbitral awards see infra
text accompanying notes 39-45.
9. K. REDDEN, PUNInVE DAMAGES § 5.18, at 53 (1980). See infra text accompanying
notes 51-66 for a discussion of punitive damages in contract actions.
10. Id.
11. In New York, for example, the law assigns punitive damage determinations to the
judiciary. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831
(1976). For a discussion of Garrity and other state court opinions regarding punitive damages
in arbitration, see infra note 67. In International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Mid-Valley,
Inc., 347 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Tex. 1972), the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas decided that the scope of an arbitrator's authority extended only to the deter-
mination of whether a breach of contract had occurred, and not to award punitive damages.
Id. at 1109. See Carper, Punitive Damages in CommercialArbitration, 41 ARB. J., Sept. 1986,
at 27, in which the author summarizes the recent domestic decisions allowing punitive dam-
ages in arbitration, concludes that the decisions do not clearly provide support for their sub-
mission and proposes that Congress ensure that the several states uniformly accept or reject
arbitral punitive damage awards.
12. See, eg., International Union, 347 F. Supp. at 1109 (holding that punitive damages
cannot be awarded absent an authorizing provision where the award constitutes a penalty).
13. Garrity, 40 N.Y.2d at 356, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833. "Punitive dam-
ages is a sanction reserved to the State, a public policy of such magnitude as to call for judicial
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Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,14 held that arbitrators
may award treble damages in an international arbitration concerning
American federal antitrust issues.15 Ignoring state law, two United
States district courts have recently held that punitive damage claims are
arbitrable under federal law and a United States court of appeals has
affirmed one district court holding. 6 Such innovative opinions demon-
strate the strong public policy now favoring arbitration as a means of
dispute resolution.
Although United States federal courts agree, international arbitra-
tors' opinions differ about whether punitive damage awards could be en-
forced in their jurisdictions. 7 Some believe international comity"8 and
the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
intrusion to prevent its contravention." Id. See generally Note, Punitive Damages in Arbitra-
tion: The Search for a Workable Rule, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 272 (1978).
14. 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
15. Id. at 3358-60.
16. Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala.
1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 569 F.
Supp. 821 (M.D.N.C. 1983). For a discussion of Willoughby, see infra text accompanying
notes 96-104. For a discussion of Willis, see infra text accompanying notes 89-95. Following
this trend, a California Court of Appeal upheld an arbitrator's punitive damage award. B~aker,
162 Cal. App. 3d at 629-30, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 683-84. See infra note 67 for a discussion of
Baker.
17. In response to this author's letter which posed the question of whether punitive dam-
ages would be enforced in their own countries, international arbitrators and lawyers from Aus-
tria, Canada, Denmark, England, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Poland
responded with conflicting opinions. (Copy of letter is on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review.) International arbitrators in the United States believe the issue is unresolved. Michael
F. Hoellering, Esq., General Counsel for the American Arbitration Association (AAA) in
New York, stated that he recalled no situation where a foreign court refused to enforce a
punitive damage award. However, he agreed that a country disfavoring punitive damages
might employ domestic public policy and refuse to enforce an award. Telephone interview
with Michael F. Hoellering, Esq., General Counsel, AAA (Mar. 21, 1986). The Society of
Maritime Arbitrators, Inc. (SMA) in New York maintains a general policy of not awarding
punitive damages in its arbitrations. Letter from Sally Sielski, Society of Maritime Arbitrators,
Inc. to Karen Tolson (Mar. 17, 1986). The SMA sent a report of a maritime arbitration in-
volving a dispute between charterers and owners of a vessel which delivered goods late from St.
Croix to New Jersey and Maryland (copy of letter and report on file at Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review). The arbitrators denied a claim for punitive damages, stating:
The Panel believes that the award of punitive damages is not within the intent and
scope of the arbitrational process which is fundamentally grounded in the concept of
equitable resolutions of commercial disputes. Moreover, there appears to be legal
precedent which would deny arbitration panels the power to award punitive
damages.
Transcoast Navigation, Ltd. v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., (S/T "ATHENA"), 1874
S.M.A. 15 (1983) (Nichols, Ottaway & Engelbrecht, Arbs.). The SMA publishes a quarterly
newsletter. Three issues in 1985 were largely devoted to articles by and letters from maritime
arbitrators who strongly disagreed with each other on whether punitive damages should be
awarded by arbitrators. See 17 ARB., Nos. 1, 2 & 4 (Mar., June & Dec. 1985).
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Arbitral Awards (Convention),' 9 signed by seventy nations, strongly sup-
port enforcement of foreign awards, even where the enforcing State's do-
mestic laws or policies would not permit enforcement.20 Other
arbitrators believe that because punitive damages penalize a wrongdoer,
and penal judgments are generally unenforceable in a foreign State, such
an award should be rendered invalid.21 Because there is no record of any
international arbitral award of punitive damages,22 the question remains
18. In Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), the United States Supreme Court defined
comity as follows:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience,
and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection
of its laws.
Id. at 163-64.
19. June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter the
Convention]. The Convention was adopted by the United Nations Conference on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration on June 10, 1958, in New York. The following countries have
ratified the Convention: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Byelorussian
SSR, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,
Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark (on behalf of the Faeroe Islands and Greenland), Demo-
cratic Republic of Germany, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, France,
Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Monaco,
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Poland,
Republic of Korea, Rumania, San Marino, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukrainian SSR, United
Arab Republic, United Kingdom (on behalf of Belize, Bermuda, Hong Kong, Gibraltar, the
Isle of Man and the United Kingdom), United Republic of Tanzania, U.S.A., USSR, Uruguay,
Yugoslavia. UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS MULTILATERAL TREATIES WITH THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUS AS AT 31 DECEM3ER 1984 685-91 (1985). Malaysia acceded
to the Convention on November 5, 1985. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL AR-
BITRATION, New York Convention of 1958. List of Contracting States [1986] 11 Y.B. COM.
ARB. 395-96. Canada acceded to the Convention on August 10, 1986 by incorporating it into
the Foreign Arbitral Awards Act, 74 B.C. REv. STAT. § 1 (1986); BRITISH COLUMBIA INT'L
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION CENTRE, Foreign Arbitral Awards Act of British Columbia, IN-
TERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: THE CANADIAN ADVANTAGE, pt. 2, at I
(1986).
20. Dr. Albert Jan van den Berg, General Editor of the Yearbook CommercialArbitration,
writes: "A punitive damage award would most likely be enforced in signatory States." Letter
from Dr. van den Berg to Karen Tolson (Mar. 24, 1986) (copy on file at Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review).
21. See infra text accompanying note 223.
22. Dr. van den Berg found no recorded enforcement action in which punitive damages
were rejected. His research included the library of the International Arbitration Department
of the TMC Asser Institute for International Law at the Hague. Dr. van den Berg stated:
"Although this library is probably one of the best documented on international arbitration in
the world, no decision could be found in which enforcement was refused because of an award
of punitive damages." Letter from Dr. van den Berg to Karen Tolson, supra note 20. The
libraries of several prominent international arbitration institutions in Austria, Denmark, Hong
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unanswered.
The major obstacle to enforcing a punitive award in international
arbitration is the "public policy exception" to enforcement in the Con-
vention. The exception states that an award which violates the public
policy of the enforcing country is void.23 As used in the exception, "pub-
lic policy" has been interpreted most often to mean policy guided by
international principles of fairness and procedural due process, rather
than by parochial policies or laws.24 This definition is preferred by most
commentators.25 However, inconsistent definitions of public policy
could test the validity of the punitive portion of an award, depending on
which country is deciding whether or not to enforce the award.
Kong, Italy, Japan and Poland reveal no record of a punitive damage award or any type of
damage award which a court refused to enforce. Letter from Dr. Werner Melis, Schiedsger-
icht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft (Council for Mutual Economic Assist-
ance) in Vienna, Austria to Karen Tolson (Apr. 4, 1986); Letter from G. Stark, Det Danske
Voldgiftsinstitut (Copenhagen Arbitration) in Copenhagen, Denmark to Karen Tolson (Mar.
17, 1986); Letter from Andrew Yui, Assistant Manager, Trade Division, The Hong Kong
General Chamber of Commerce, to Karen Tolson (Mar. 17, 1986) and Letter from B.H. Tis-
dall, Secretary-General, The Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, to Karen Tolson
(Mar. 24, 1986); Letter from Mauro Ferrante, Secretary-General, Associazione Italiana Per
L'Arbitrato in Rome, Italy, to Karen Tolson (Mar. 19, 1986); Letter from Hiroshi Hattori,
Director, The Japan Commercial Arbitration Association in Tokyo, Japan, to Karen Tolson
(Mar. 12, 1986); Letter from Stanislaw Mozejko, Secretary, International Court of Arbitration
for Marine and Inland Navigation at Gdynia, to Karen Tolson (Mar. 17, 1986). There is also
no record of such an award in the auspices of the ICC Court or the International Centre for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Letter from Sigvard Jarvin, General Counsel,
ICC Court of Arbitration in Paris, France, to Karen Tolson (Mar. 21, 1986); Letter from
Bertrand P. Marchais, Counsel for ICSID in Washington, D.C., to Karen Tolson (Mar. 12,
1986) (copies of all letters on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
23. The Convention states:
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought
finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitra-
tion under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition and enforcement of the award would be contrary to the
public policy of that country.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,
art. V(2), 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. See infra text accompanying
notes 127-94, for a discussion of the potential effect of the public policy exception on punitive
damage awards.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 187-94, for a discussion of what constitutes "inter-
national" public policy.
25. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Court Decisions on the
New York Convention 1958 [1985] 10 Y.B. COM. ARB. 401-02; Ehrenhaft, supra note 6, at
1212-16; van den Berg, Should an International Arbitrator Apply the New York Arbitration
Convention of 1958?, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION 45, 48-49 (J. Schultsz & A.J. van den
Berg, eds. 1982); Bernini, The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards By National Judiciaries:
A Trial of the New York Convention's Ambit and Workability, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION
51, 59-60.
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Because few countries even recognize civil punishment-much less
punitive damages26-- it is unlikely that enforcement of a punitive damage
award will be consistent with the public policy or domestic laws of most
countries. If the arbitral award is not enforced by the court which has
jurisdiction over the asset-holder, the award-holder may not receive any
punitive damages, despite the fact they are due him under the American
law governing the contract.27
This Comment analyzes the problems surrounding the enforcement
of an international arbitral award of punitive damages. First, it explains
when arbitration is "international" and how public policies behind puni-
tive damages may conflict with those of the arbitral forum. Second, it
explains how a party enforces an international arbitration award and
how an enforcing State's domestic public policies and its familiarity with
civil penalties like punitive damages affect enforcement. Finally, this
Comment sets forth a proposal for alternative enforcement procedures
and gives advice to contracting parties who wish to avoid the problems
inherent in enforcing an international arbitral punitive damage award.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
A. The Nature of International Arbitration
Arbitration is "international" when parties from different countries
submit to arbitration questions concerning transnational commercial
business transactions.28 "Domestic" arbitration denotes arbitral pro-
ceedings between citizens of the country in which the arbitration takes
place (the forum).2 9
26. See infra text accompanying notes 207-41 for a discussion of civil punishment in other
countries.
27. See supra note 6 for a discussion of choice of law in the arbitration agreement.
28. The Geneva Convention of April 21, 1961, art. 1, states that litigation arising from
international commercial operations constitutes "international arbitration" when it is em-
ployed by parties from different countries. Swedish law mandates only that the parties' na-
tional residences differ. French law adds to the mandate of different nationalities that the
operations must affect international commerce. Finally, U.S. law labels a proceeding "interna-
tional arbitration" when foreign law, foreign countries' concerns or international commerce is
at all involved. Thieffry, The Finality of Awards in International Arbitration, 2 J. INT'L ARB.
27, 31 (1985).
29. For the most part, international arbitration procedures assimilate domestic arbitration
procedures. The essential qualities are set forth below for the practitioner unfamiliar with
them.
Parties to a transaction-commercial or otherwise-may contract to have specified dis-
putes submitted to arbitration, a process growing in popularity as an alternative dispute resolu-
tion mechanism to traditional adjudication. See generally Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?,
68 A.B.A. J. 274 (Mar. 1982). In American domestic arbitration, the parties choose a neutral
party-the arbitrator (or panel of arbitrators)-who listens to a presentation of the conflicting
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The Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa and the Soviet Union have dis-
covered that international arbitration can be the optimum means of co-
facts by each party, his counsel, his representative or all three. After the presentation, the
arbitrator renders an equitable, binding decision in writing. The parties should voluntarily
comply with the award. If one does not, the other(s) may have a court "confirm" the award,
as long as the arbitration was conducted properly. An award may be set aside in most state
jurisdictions where the award was procured by fraud or corruption or where arbitrators were
not impartial, were engaged in misconduct or exceeded their powers under the agreement.
See, ag., § 1286.2 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which states:
[T]he court shall vacate the award if the court determines that:
(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(b) There was corruption in any of the arbitrators;
(c) The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a
neutral arbitrator;
(d) The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected
without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted; or
(e) The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the
arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or by
the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy or by other
conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982). Confirmation may involve a brief review and
entry of the award or a hearing on its validity. Once confirmed, an award becomes as enforce-
able as a court judgment. The rules of the AAA are the generally accepted rules for domestic
arbitration. Rule 47(c) states: "Parties to these Rules shall be deemed to have consented that
judgment upon the arbitration award may be entered in any Federal or State Court having
jurisdiction thereof." INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBrIRATION, Arbitra-
tion Rules [1982] 7 Y.B. COM. ARB. 189, 199 [hereinafter Arbitration Rules]. See also 1 LAw.
ARB. LETTER No. 3, Sept. 1973, at 1.
The parties' agreement defines the rules and procedures of the arbitration and usually
specifies the substantive (state or federal) law governing their contract. See generally Aksen,
What You Need to Know About Arbitration Law-A "Triality" of Research, 10 FORUM 793,
793-96 (1975). See supra note 6 for a discussion of choice of law in an arbitration agreement.
The forum is completely private and confidential by law. AAA Rule 25 states: "The
Arbitrator shall maintain the privacy of the hearings unless the law provides to the contrary."
Arbitration Rules, supra, at 189, 195. Its proceedings and evidence usually go unrecorded and
awards may be rendered without reporting the reasons for the decisions made. AAA Rule 23
states that proceedings will be recorded only if the parties request a record. Id. Arbitration
hearings are not limited by judicial rules of evidence and are not restricted in the kinds of
complaints that can be arbitrated, unless the parties agree otherwise. Nor are remedies con-
fined by established legal principles-equity governs. AAA Rule 31 states: "The Arbitrator
shall be the judge of the relevancy and materiality of the evidence offered and conformity to
legal rules of evidence shall not be necessary." Id. at 196. AAA Rule 43 states: "The Arbitra-
tor may grant any remedy or relief which the Arbitrator deems just and equitable and within
the scope of the agreement of the parties, including, but not limited to, specific performance of
a contract." Id. at 198.
As a result of the lack of formality, these hearings usually occur sooner and may cost
substantially less than trials. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395,
404 (1967) (arbitration is quick and economical and relieves court congestion). The minimum
AAA filing fee for an arbitration is $200. To date, the largest administrative filing fee known
to the AAA regional office in Los Angeles, California was $45,000. Telephone interview with
Jackie Downs, Deputy Director of Case Administration, AAA (Sept. 5, 1986). Also, since the
parties voluntarily agree to submit to arbitration, about 90% of participants comply with the
final arbitral award. See Major Arbitration Institutions: Duration and Administrative Cost of
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operatively settling disputes.3 ° Many countries, including Canada,
England, France, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States, have
Proceedings and Estimated Rate of Compliance with Awards, I. RICHTER, INTERNATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CLAIMS: AVOIDING & RESOLVING DISPUTES table 10-2, at 188-89 (1983).
30. See Ovington, Arbitration and U.S. Antitrust Law: A Conflict of Policies, 2 J. INT'L
ARB. 53, 53 (1985). Another author states: "Arbitration has emerged as the preferred remedy
for resolving private international commercial disputes." Carbonneau, Rendering Arbitral
Awards With Reasons: The Elaboration of a Common Law of International Transactions, 23
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 579, 579-80 & n.1 (1985). "[A]rbitration is the only means of
settlement of disputes arising from economic relations between economic organizations in
member-countries" of the Council for Mutual Assistance. Melis, Enforcement of Foreign
Awards in European Member-Countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 2 ARB.
INT'L 33 (1986). The member-countries of the Council are Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Ger-
man Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the Soviet Union. All of these
countries are signatories to the Convention.
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has recently espoused the arguments
favoring international arbitration:
Arbitration is a favored method of settling international business disputes. By
selecting the forum for dispute resolution, and often choosing the substantive law
that will apply, parties to international contracts ensure the neutrality, certainty, and
predictability that are essential to the continued growth of international trade. With-
out an arbitration clause, an international trader runs the risk of being forced to
litigate in one or more of several jurisdictions, including the courts of the other
party's home country. Arbitrations also are attractive because they are resolved
more rapidly than most judicial litigation and because they provide the parties with
greater assurance that trade secrets and other sensitive business information will re-
main confidential. The legitimate interest of parties in protecting their business
secrets makes arbitration especially useful, particularly because some countries make
all court papers public.
Brief of the International Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae at 3, Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985) (Nos. 83-1569, 83-1733) [here-
inafter ICC Mitsubishi Brief].
Clearly, because law varies from state to state, it is advantageous to select a forum to
govern disputes. Selection avoids the unpredictability inevitable when the parties do not agree
on the governing law in advance.
In some cases, judicial dispute resolution better serves the ends of justice than arbitration.
Because arbitrations and awards are generally confidential, injured persons other than the
claimant may never know about the proceeding, the wrongdoer's violations or the arbitral
result. Parties not aware of the proceeding also may never be able to assert their own rights.
In most jurisdictions, an arbitral award has the same collateral estoppel and res judicata effects
as a court award, so the private hearing affects future claims on the same issue. Parties who
are not included in the private proceeding may lose their rights to legal action on a claim. See
generally Note, Foreign Judgments Based on Foreign Arbitral Awards: The Applicability ofRes
Judicata, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 223 (1975). See, e.g., 8 LAW. ARB. LEIrER No. 1, Mar. 1984, at
1 (collateral estoppel in domestic arbitration); 3 LAW. ARB. LEITER No. 27, Sept. 1979, at I
(res judicata in domestic arbitration).
An arbitral award generally may not be appealed or set aside before or after it is con-
firmed, even for errors of law, unless it is clearly arbitrary. Section 10 of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, for example, states a court may vacate an award "[w]here the award was procured by
corruption, fraud, or undue means... [w]here there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators... [or] [w]here the arbitrators exceeded their powers.. . ." 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
See infra text accompanying notes 70-74, for a discussion of the Federal Arbitration Act. See
also Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953); 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1986); M. DOMKE, DOMKE
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established procedures for holding international arbitrations within their
borders and for enforcing foreign arbitral awards within their jurisdic-
tions." Other countries-from Brazil to the People's Republic of
China-have established procedures for domestic arbitrations which may
involve their own citizens and those from different nations.32
The American Arbitration Association (AAA) is the largest forum
in the United States for domestic and international commercial arbitra-
tion.33 The other three most well-known international arbitration fora
are the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration (ICC
Court),34 the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes (ICSID) 35 and the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL).36 While ICSID has its own rules for enforc-
ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ch. 29, § 29:06 (1984) (written opinions are not necessary in
arbitration).
Finally, international arbitrators are often business persons, rather than legal scholars or
lawyers. AAA Rules 12 and 19 state that the qualifications of arbitrators are minimal. They
require only that arbitrators must be neutral and subject to disqualification for bias. Arbitra-
tion Rules, supra note 29, at 189, 193-94. Thus, although they may be generally more knowl-
edgeable than juries, they are not briefed on applicable laws the way juries are briefed in court
proceedings. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19 n.25, Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct.
3346 [hereinafter United States Mitsubishi Brief].
In sum, whether there are more commentators in favor of or militating against interna-
tional arbitration, it is a "preferred" means of dispute resolution. It provides an informal yet
sophisticated forum where parties of diverse nationality can resolve disputes with some degree
of predictability. Moreover, arbitration conserves time, resources and aggravation associated
with adjudication in a foreign State.
31. See generally Thieffry, supra note 28; Close, Choosing a Forum for International Com-
mercial Arbitration, 76 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 166 (1982).
32. Domestic arbitration procedures of most countries involved in international trade are
reported in the first eleven volumes of the Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (1976-86).
33. The AAA rules for commercial arbitration are set forth at Arbitration Rules, supra
note 29.
34. The ICC Court was established in 1923. Most of its present clientele come from West-
ern Europe, Arab countries and the United States. It provides arbitrators for hearings outside
the ICC, rather than administering hearings through its own auspices. Close, supra note 31, at
173-74. The ICC Court rules are codified at ICC Publication No. 291 (1975). They are also
set forth at INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Rules of Concilia-
tion of the International Chamber of Commerce [1983] 8 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 200. For a discus-
sion of three of the four major international forums mentioned in this section-ICC, ICSID
and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)-see Bran-
son & Tupman, Selecting an Arbitral Forum: A Guide to Cost-Effective International Arbitra-
tion, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 933 (1984); see generally ICC ARBITRATION, supra note 6.
35. ICSID was formed by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Be-
tween States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090,
575 U.N.T.S. 159. The ICSID Convention was ratified by 67 foreign States. Thieffry, supra
note 28, at 29 n.8. The ICSID Court rules are codified at ICSID/4/Rev. 1 (May 1975).
36. On June 21, 1985, UNCITRAL adopted the "UNCITRAL Model Law on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration." Report of the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law
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ing awards rendered under its auspices,37 the AAA, the ICC Court and
UNCITRAL have no such aid to enforcement."8 Armed with an award
from one of the latter institutions, a party must independently seek en-
forcement measures.
The procedures for enforcing an international award are somewhat
different from those in domestic arbitration. After the international arbi-
trator renders an award, the successful party must have a court confirm
it.39 The national court of the country in which the arbitration takes
place usually confirms the award. With confirmation, most international
tribunals recognize the award as a final court judgment.40 However, this
does not guarantee that the judgment will be enforced.41
A successful party may seek enforcement in any State where an un-
successful party retains assets.42 The national court enforcing the judg-
ment may be the same as the court confirming it, if the debtor owns
assets in that country. However, the enforcing court might be the na-
tional court of another country which reviews the award after the first
country has confirmed the award. The enforcing court must decide
whether to approve or deny the award's enforcement within its own
boundaries. Unlike domestic arbitration, this review may be cursory or
substantive, depending upon the country's public policies or laws.4 3 For
example, some countries authorize the judiciary to review the merits of
an award while others demand that the award go through diplomatic
channels before several government officers decide whether it is valid.'
It is during this last stage-enforcement-that the debtor will dispute the
punitive damages element of the underlying award, claiming that portion
infects the entire award. The objecting party's argument would be formi-
dable because in most States, punitive damages are completely unknown
on the Work of its Eighteenth Session, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. at I (No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/40/
17 Annex 1 (1985); 2 ARB. INT'L 11 (1986).
37. ICSID Convention, supra note 35, at art. 52(2).
38. Branson & Tupman, supra note 34, at 934-36.
39. The court order affirms that the court has jurisdiction over the matter, declares the
arbitral proceedings were proper and renders a judgment with which the unsuccessful party
must comply by law. I. RICHTER, supra note 29, at 187.
40. Id.
41. See infra notes 118-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems in en-
forcing an international arbitral award.
42. Foreign courts may attach the losing party's assets to force compliance with the arbi-
tral award. I. RICHTER, supra note 29, at 187; Close, supra note 31, at 182-83.
43. I. RICHTER, supra note 29, at 193. "Nations without a blanket policy of enforcing
foreign arbitral awards may subject the entire dispute to de novo consideration (a second look)
by their own courts." Id. at 193.
44. For a discussion of enforcement procedures in different countries, see infra note 207.
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or violate public policy.4 5 For example, punitive damages are considered
"penal" in some circumstances and it is well settled that there is an inter-
national policy against enforcing one country's judgment which punishes
another's citizens.4 6 If these penal damages under one country's laws are
adjudged unenforceable against another country's citizen, the enforcing
court will render the award void.47
Even though it is clear that United States law properly governed an
arbitrator's decision,48 conflict over enforcement in a foreign forum may
occur. Public policies behind punitive damages may not be served by an
award in the international arbitral forum.4 9 A party challenging an
award is most likely to succeed when the enforcing country's laws emas-
culate or nullify the award because its enforcement violates that coun-
try's public policy."0
B. Punitive Damages in Arbitration
1. Punitive damages in contractual disputes
Punitive damages have two purposes. The first is to deter the
wrongdoer, as well as others, from offensive conduct. The second is to
severely punish the tortfeasor in a civil manner for conduct which bor-
ders on the criminal.51 Since the 1800's, courts have awarded plaintiffs
45. See infra text accompanying notes 207-41.
46. Foreign States will not enforce foreign penal judgments. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 483 (Tent. Final Draft July 15, 1985) re-
porter's notes 1-4 (available on LEXIS); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 89 (1969); see also Lowenfeld, Public Law in the InternationalArena: Conflict ofLaws, Inter-
national Law, and Some Suggestions For Their Interaction, 163 HAGUE ACADEMY, RECEUIL
DES CoRs 310 (1979).
47. See infra text accompanying notes 195-206 for a discussion of whether punitive dam-
ages are penal.
48. See supra note 6 for a discussion of choice of law in the arbitration agreement.
49. See infra notes 67-104 for a discussion of recent cases allowing punitive damages in
arbitration.
50. For a discussion of public policy and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, see infra
text accompanying notes 127-241.
51. M. MINZER, J. NATES, C. KIMBALL & D. AXELROD, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS
§ 40.12 (1962) [hereinafter MINZER & NATES]; I J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES LAW AND PRACTICE, § 4.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1985) [hereinafter GHIARDI & KIRCHER];
see Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 522 (1957). The
most widely cited objectives of punitive damages are to punish the wrongdoer where no crimi-
nal action lies and to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from the opprobrious conduct.
Other possible reasons for punitive damages are to compensate the plaintiff for expenses
not covered in an award (such as litigation costs and attorneys' fees) and to discourage soci-
ety's revenge against the defendant. MINZER & NATES, supra, § 40.12; see GHIARDI &
KIRCHER, supra, § 4.3(A); see also Note, supra, at 520-22; Belli, Punitive Damages: Their
History, Their Use and Their Worth in Present Day Society, 49 UMKC L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1980).
The latter reasons are not widely recited because compensation is accomplished by other reme-
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punitive damages where a defendant's conduct was "malicious, oppres-
sive, fraudulent, willful, reckless, wantonly indifferent, or opprobri-
ous."52 Tort law almost exclusively governed these claims. Yet recently,
courts have held punitive damages are available in certain breach of con-
tract actions when one party commits a tortious act. Examples include
fraudulent inducement, malicious interference with business enterprises
or contracts, defamation, trespass, nuisance, gross negligence and reck-
lessness, outrageous conduct in settling insurance claims and violations
of civil rights.13 Thus, an international contracting party who commits
one of these torts may be subject to punitive damages whether an action
is brought against him under tort or contract law.
In the United States, contract actions which carry punitive damage
remedies include breach of contract to marry (where the claim asserts
fraud or malice), 4 breach of a public service contract (where common
carriers, such as water and power companies, fail to carry out a duty
imposed by statutory law),"5 breach of contract accompanied by fraud
(usually fraudulent misrepresentation),56 breach of contract between par-
ties with a fiduciary relationship,5 7 and breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing in contractual relations. 8 Some recent cases in this area
concern claims by an insured that his insurer acted arbitrarily or in bad
faith. 9 Also prominent are disputes in which an attorney engages in
dies and societal revenge is too similar to criminal punishment. See Note, supra, at 521-22;
Belli, supra, at 5-6. This Comment will concentrate on the primary policies of punishment and
deterrence in analyzing international punitive damage awards.
52. MINZER & NATES, supra note 51, § 40.11, at 8.
53. K. REDDEN, supra note 9, § 2.6, at 42. Total failure to perform a contract (nonfea-
sance) generally will not be considered a tort, but improper performance of contractual obliga-
tions (misfeasance) may give rise to tort liability in the United States. Id. § 5.18, at 51-52.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 42, § 4.3(A).
59. In Vernon Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 161 Ind. App. 413, 316 N.E.2d 381
(1974), the defendant insurer refused, without explanation, to pay the plaintiff insured's claim.
The Indiana Court of Appeals authorized a judgment of punitive damages where the jury
found that the insurer's breach of contract itself amounted to fraud, malice, gross negligence or
oppression. Id. at 416-17, 316 N.E.2d at 384. The court, influenced by the state's strong
public policy in favor of regulating the insurance industry, affirmed the jury's award of $17,000
in punitive damages. Id. at 415, 418, 316 N.E.2d at 383-84. See also Henderson v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 695 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1983) (jury award of punitive damages
affirmed by court where insurer failed to produce insurance policy after insured's request for
production); Phillips v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 473 F. Supp. 984 (D. Vt. 1979) (award of punitive
damages proper if in addition to wrongful concealment, insurer acted maliciously and dishon-
estly). Cf. Wiggins v. North Am. Equitable Life Assurance Co., 644 F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1981)
(under Maryland law, punitive damages may not be awarded where life insurance beneficiary
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unscrupulous and negligent conduct in connection with an employment
contract. ° Moreover, in 1984, the Supreme Court of California held
that punitive damages are available where a party has wrongfully denied
the existence of a contract in bad faith and without probable cause.6 1
Punitive damages are rarely available in breach of contract actions
because contractual damages should only compensate and should not
punish, according to the English common law case of Addis v. Gramo-
phone Co.62 In Addis, the House of Lords noted but three exceptions
when contract damages should punish: (1) actions for breach of promise
to marry; (2) actions against a banker who wrongfully refuses to pay a
customer's good check; and (3) actions against sellers of land who fail to
give good title. 3 Yet, in the 1964 case of Rookes v. Barnard,' the House
of Lords authorized punitive damages under certain circumstances.
These included situations where government employees commit oppres-
sive acts, where a defendant's conduct was calculated to make a profit
exceeding the compensation payable to the plaintiff and where expressly
authorized by statutes.65 The more recent case may evidence a trend in
sued insurance company for breach of contract; however, punitive damages may be awarded
where malice consists of evil or rancorous motive and deliberately and willfully injures plain-
tiff); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482,
appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 912 (1979) (jury's award of $5,000,000 in punitive damages for
breach of disability insurance contract overturned as excessive as a matter of law).
60. See Annotation, Allowance of Punitive Damages in Action Against Attorney for Mal-
practice, 13 A.L.R. 4TH 95 (1982); Jackson, Professional Responsibility, 16 IND. L. REv. 265
(1983); Note, Punitive Damages in Attorney Malpractice Cases, 8 J. LEGAL PROF. 217 (1983).
61. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206
Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984) (dealer's action against oil company for breach of contract and breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); see also Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.,
24 Cal. 3d 809, 620 P.2d 141, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1979) (claims concerning breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing sound in tort because insurer and insured have a "spe-
cial relationship" and punitive damages are awardable for such breach).
62. 1909 App. Cas. 488; see also GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 51, at Cases, § 4.3(A).
As the Court of Exchequer's rule in the 1854 case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145
(Ex. Ch. 1854), states:
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages
which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be
such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, . . . or such
as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at
the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.
Id. at 151. The Hadley restriction does not encompass punitive damages since parties cannot
contemplate these damages in advance of breach. Also, punitive damages imposed on unsus-
pecting parties might serve to inhibit contracting, since the risks inherent in any business trans-
action are increased in an unpredictable manner.
63. Addis, 1909 App. Cas. 488, at 495. Even where death occurs out of a breach of con-
tract, the British courts have only allowed a recovery of pecuniary losses. B. KERCHER & M.
NOONE, REMEDIES 103-04 (1983) [hereinafter KERCHER & NOONE].
64. 1964 App. Cas. 1129.
65. KERCHER & NOONE, supra note 63, at 232.
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English law towards expanding punishment in contract claims which in-
volve employer/employee agreements or involve the proper compensa-
tion a user of services pays to a provider.
As will be explained below, civil law countries recognize some forms
of civil punishment, such as fines for wrongful behavior. However, puni-
tive damages, as common law recognizes them, are foreign to civil law
sovereigns. 6
2. Arbitral awards of punitive damages
The several United States have conflicting policies and court rulings
on whether punitive damage issues may be submitted to and awarded in
domestic arbitration.67 Federal courts, however, are in harmony and
66. See infra text accompanying notes 207-41.
67. Recent state law decisions explain American public policies concerning punitive dam-
ages which reflect foreign countries' concerns about arbitral punitive damage awards. A brief
discussion of these decisions will give American parties an idea of the present domestic status
of punitive damages in arbitration.
The 1976 case of Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386
N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976), demonstrates New York's reluctance to grant arbitrators power to award
punitive damages. Garrity, an author, and Lyle Stuart, Inc., a publisher, had entered into a
contract with broad arbitration clauses. Garrity accused Lyle Stuart of fraudulent inducement
and malicious harassment and invoked the arbitration clause. An arbitrator awarded Garrity
$45,000 in royalties and $7500 in punitive damages. Id. at 355-56, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386
N.Y.S.2d at 832. When Garrity tried to confirm the award, the publisher objected, claiming
punitive damages were beyond the arbitrator's authority. Id. at 356, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386
N.Y.S.2d at 832.
Although the trial court confirmed Garrity's award, the New York Court of Appeals, in a
4-3 decision, vacated that portion of the award designated as punitive damages. Id. at 360, 353
N.E.2d at 797, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 835. The court held that punitive damage issues are reserved
to the state courts because such an award is intended primarily to serve the public good. A
private arbitration, the court continued, is an improper forum for such issues. Id. at 358-59,
353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
The Garrity court feared that because arbitrators may ignore substantive law in favor of
principles of equity, arbitrators would "ride roughshod over strong policies in the law which
control coercive private conduct and confine to the State and its courts the infliction of puni-
tive sanctions on the wrongdoers." Id. at 357, 353 N.E.2d at 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832. It also
concluded that "[t]he day is long past since barbaric man achieved redress by private punitive
measures." Id. at 360, 353 N.E.2d at 797, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
The Garrity court's concerns are in part well-founded. American arbitrators are free to
fashion a remedy for the dispute before them and may conduct their hearings without adhering
to rules of evidence or procedure established by American courts. See supra note 29. How-
ever, an award may be set aside in most state jurisdictions where the award was procured by
fraud or corruption or where arbitrators were not impartial, engaged in misconduct or ex-
ceeded their powers under the agreement. Id.
The dissenters in Garrity argued that the public policy favoring peaceful dispute resolu-
tion overrides the policy which precludes a private punitive remedy. Therefore, the award of
punitive damages in the Garrity arbitration was not violative of public policy. Garrity, 40
N.Y.2d at 362-63, 353 N.E.2d at 798-99, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 836 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting). The
dissent stated that the rule in other New York cases provided "that only where the public
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favor their arbitrability in domestic arbitration and most likely would
interest clearly supersedes the concerns of the parties should courts intervene and assert exclu-
sive dominion over disputes in arbitration." Id. at 365, 353 N.E.2d at 800, 386 N.Y.S.2d at
838 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting). See also Note, Arbitration: The Award of Punitive Damages as a
Public Policy Question, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 546 (1976).
The case of Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1984), demon-
strates the California Legislature's strong support of arbitration as an effective dispute resolu-
tion technique for medical malpractice disputes. Mrs. Baker contracted with her doctor for
breast reduction surgery. They agreed that "any dispute as to medical malpractice, that is as to
whether any medical services rendered under this Contract were unnecessary or unauthorized
or were improperly, negligently or incompetently rendered, will be determined by submission to
arbitration as provided by California law .... Id. at 622-23, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 679 (emphasis
in original). It is undisputed that after the defendant performed the surgery, Baker developed
an infection which was ineffectively treated. Resulting scars made it necessary for her to un-
dergo extensive corrective plastic surgery. She compelled arbitration to resolve the tort claims
against Sadick. Id. at 622, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 678. The trial court confirmed an award of
punitive damages for fraud, willful neglect, and malicious acts. The California Court of Ap-
peal affirmed. Id. at 622-23, 631, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 678-79, 684.
Even though Baker's claims did not involve breach of the contract, the court of appeal
held that the agreement was broad enough to include all claims arising out of the contract,
including those for intentional torts. Id. at 625-26, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 681. The court stated
that the public policy reasons for excluding punitive damage claims from arbitration, including
those asserted in Garrity, were weak when compared to the possible result: the defendant
could release himself from liability for punitive damages by agreeing to arbitrate all disputes
with someone like the plaintiff. Id. at 630, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 684. A plaintiff like Baker may
agree to arbitrate without knowing some of her claims are nonarbitrable. The defendant then
receives a windfall by exculpating himself from certain legal actions. The Garrity court did not
voice concern that the instant parties may have possessed unequal bargaining power. The
Garrity court mentioned only in the abstract that an arbitration would be a "trap for the
unwary" if punitive damage claims were arbitrable and that the State must impose a social
sanction because selection of an arbitrator "is often restricted or manipulatable by the party in
a superior bargaining position ...." Garrity, 40 N.Y.2d at 358-59, 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386
N.Y.S.2d at 834.
The Baker court also found that an arbitral award would serve "the dual purpose of
punishing and hopefully deterring the wrongdoer from engaging in similar egregious conduct
in the future." Baker, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 629, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 683. With this point, the
court perhaps improperly assumes that an arbitration carries out the punitive damage function
of deterrence. Effective deterrence depends upon whether physicians hear about this arbitral
punishment and whether they are deterred by it. Media and word of mouth may achieve this
notice, especially with the threat of excessive money damages posed to the large California
medical community. However, notice to potential wrongdoers is not guaranteed. See Com-
ment, Awarding Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice Arbitration, 20 CAL. W.L. REv. 312
(1984).
Other cases involving punitive damages in arbitration include: Cuevas v. Potamkin
Dodge, Inc., 455 So.2d 398 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (court allowed unchallenged punitive
damage award to stand); Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 331 S.E.2d 726 (N.C. App.
1985) (punitive damages awarded and confirmed for untimely completion of construction pro-
ject and refusal to pay excess charges); Grissom v. Greener & Sumner Constr. Inc., 676
S.W.2d 709 (Tex. App. 1984) (punitive damages awarded in arbitration and confirmed in sub-
contractor's suit against general contractor for breach of contract and independent tort). Cf.
Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assocs., 102 N.M. 607, 698 P.2d 880 (1985) (punitive damages and fraud in
inducement both held nonarbitrable in New Mexico for breach of contract action). See also
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favor their arbitrability in international arbitration. United States legis-
lation and case law strongly support arbitration for resolving disputes.
Federal and state court decisions cite public policy reasons which man-
date the development of and the resort to arbitration over adjudication
whenever possible.6 These policy reasons include court congestion, the
money and time spent on litigation and the litigiousness of the American
public.69 The United States Arbitration Act (Federal Arbitration Act or
Act)70 governs all interstate and international commercial business trans-
actions in which the parties have agreed-in advance or at the time of the
dispute-to arbitrate.7  The Act codifies the federal rule that an agree-
ment to submit any contractual dispute to arbitration "shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."72 This has been interpreted to
mean that, absent illegality or fraud in the agreement to arbitrate, neither
state nor federal courts will interfere with the parties' desire to
arbitrate.73
The Act demonstrates congressional confidence in arbitration and
encourages courts to adopt this confidence. Since the Act was passed in
1924, there has been a trend in favor of courts' granting to arbitrators
Penna, Arbitration: Punitive Damages and Public Policy, N.Y.L.J. Jan. 14, 1986, at 1; Hoeller-
ing, Remedies in Arbitration, I J. INT'L ARB. 516, 520-22 (1984).
68. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) ("In enacting § 2 of the federal Act,
Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states
to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to
resolve by arbitration."); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24-25 (1983) ("Any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration."); Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp.
353, 362 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (1 1th Cir. 1985) ("Congress has enunciated a
broad and pervasive federal policy that.., mandates that whenever a written contract evi-
dencing a transaction in interstate commerce contains an arbitration provision, that provision
must be given effect by state and federal courts alike."); Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618,
628, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676, 682 (1984) (There is a "strong public policy in favor of settling arbi-
trations speedily with a minimum of court interference.").
69. See generally Burger, supra note 29.
70. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act was added in 1970.
Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 693 (1970).
71. The Act states in pertinent part:
A written provision in any maritime transaction [including any matters in foreign
commerce within admiralty jurisdiction] or a contract evidencing a transaction in-
volving commerce [defined as commerce among the several States or with foreign
nations] to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, . . . shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id.
72. Id.
73. Section 10 of the Act states that a United States district court may vacate an award:
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powers traditionally reserved for the judiciary-such as authority over
domestic securities and antitrust issues. This liberal trend grants to
arbitrators jurisdiction to award civil punishment including punitive
damages.
The United States Supreme Court has not specifically decided
whether punitive damage claims are arbitrable. However, the Court has
held that international arbitrators can decide United States antitrust is-
sues involving treble damages, which are one-third compensatory and
two-thirds punitiveY.7  This authority supports the conclusion that
United States courts must respect punitive damages awarded by arbitra-
tors, at least in international disputes. Also, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and two federal district courts agree
that domestic arbitrators can award punitive damages where parties have
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct.., or of any other misbe-
havior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers ....
Id. § 10; see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (Section 2 of the Act
declared national policy in favor of arbitration applicable in state and federal courts); Wil-
loughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 362 (N.D. Ala. 1984).
For a discussion of the facts and reasoning of Willoughby, see infra text accompanying notes
96-104.
74. The three most notable nonarbitrable claims were violations of the federal Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77b-78kk (1982) and the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). Although the
Securities Act claims are still nonarbitrable, the latter two Acts have been held arbitrable in
recent United States Supreme Court decisions. In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506
(1974), the Supreme Court granted an order to compel arbitration when a United States com-
pany brought a securities law action against a German individual under the 1934 Act. This
reversed a prior holding in Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), that
securities claims under the 1933 Act were nonarbitrable in the context of a domestic dispute.
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985), the
Supreme Court held federal antitrust claims under the Sherman Act could be arbitrated. See
infra notes 77-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mitsubishi. See also S.A. Minera-
cao Da Trinidade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (claimed viola-
tions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) held nonarbitrable);
I. RICHTER, supra note 29, at 192. "American court decisions, indicat[e] a clear trend toward
effective enforcement of international arbitration awards, at least by U.S. courts." I. RiCHTER,
supra note 29, at 192.
75. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
Treble damages are one-third compensatory because the initial amount of damages awarded by
the trier of fact is compensation for the wrong. This sum is automatically tripled, as a punitive
sanction, to deter the wrongdoer and others from future conduct and to punish the defendant.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (West Supp. 1984). See, e.g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S.
426, reh'g denied, 349 U.S. 925 (1955), in which the United States Supreme Court held that
"the punitive two-thirds portion of a treble-damage antitrust recovery" is taxable gross income.
Id. at 427 (emphasis added).
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agreed to submit all their disputes to arbitration.76
a. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
In the 1985 case of Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
outh, Inc.,7 Mitsubishi, a Japanese corporation, contracted with Soler, a
Puerto Rican corporation, for Soler to sell Mitsubishi vehicles in Puerto
Rico. The parties agreed that all disputes arising out of their agreement
would be settled by arbitration in Japan, under the Japan Commercial
Arbitration Association rules.78
When new car sales decreased in 1981, Soler could not meet its ex-
pected sales volume of Mitsubishi automobiles. The parties disagreed
over Soler's proposed changes for distributing the cars. Soler accused
Mitsubishi of antitrust violations and Mitsubishi filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, seeking an
order to compel arbitration. Soler responded that the policies underlying
the Sherman Act prohibited arbitration by a foreign tribunal.79
Because it found that the international character of the contract and
agreement to arbitrate governed even the antitrust claims, the district
court ordered arbitration.80 The United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It ordered that paral-
lel judicial and arbitral proceedings should handle the nonarbitrable anti-
trust and the other arbitrable claims separately."
In a decision with important ramifications for international arbitra-
tion, the United States Supreme Court ordered that the entire matter be
arbitrated in Japan. The Court found that the arbitration agreement ap-
76. Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 363 (1984),
aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp.
821, 824 (M.D.N.C. 1983). Two authors have opined:
With respect to American Antitrust laws, it can be anticipated that some foreign
states will enforce only the compensatory portion of the damages, and some "might
regard the entire judgment as penal and decline to enforce it, both because of the
method of assessing damages and because the plaintiff had acted as a 'private attor-
ney general,' le., had sued to enforce a public law."
Newman & Burrows, Consequences of International Arbitration of Antitrust and RICO,
N.Y.L.J. Dec. 23, 1985, at 1, 2 (citing RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES, § 483 (Tent. Final Draft July 15, 1985) reporter's note 4 (available on
LEXIS)).
77. 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
78. Id. at 3349. The Mitsubishi/Soler arbitration agreement submitted to arbitration "[a]ll
disputes, controversies or differences which may arise between [the parties] out of or in relation
to ... this Agreement, or for the breach thereof." Id.
79. Id. at 3350.
80. Id. at 3351.
81. Id. at 3351-53.
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plied to all disputes, including those concerning domestic statutory viola-
tions." Recognizing that international comity, respect for foreign
tribunals and the need for predictability in resolving international com-
mercial disputes were vital, the Court upheld the parties' agreement by
respecting their original choice of forum. 3 The Court reiterated that
"[w]e cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and interna-
tional waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and re-
solved in our courts." 4 The Court's line of reasoning reflects the Federal
Arbitration Act's national policies favoring arbitration-international as
well as domestic-even where parochial statutory claims are at issue.85
The Mitsubishi Court further held that the treble damages claim
available within the United States may also be available in proceedings
outside the United States. The Court, quoting the Second Circuit, stated:
"A claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a private
matter. The Sherman Act is designed to promote the national
82. Id. at 3354-55.
83. Id. at 3356-58.
84. Id. at 3356 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972)).
85. In a controversial footnote, the Mitsubishi Court implied it would review a Japanese
arbitral award if the foreign tribunal improperly adjudicated United States federal antitrust
issues. It stated that if the choice of forum and choice of law clauses in an arbitration agree-
ment operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory reme-
dies for antitrust violations, it would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as
against public policy. Id. at 3360 n.19. The extent to which this displays a strong policy in
favor of international arbitration or international comity is questionable. At the very least, it is
obvious the Supreme Court would protect Americans' rights provided in the antitrust laws,
possibly including rights to treble damages, even after an arbitration is held.
By adopting this rule, the Court prohibits a party who agrees to arbitrate in an interna-
tional forum from waiving his rights to treble damages. The Court would condemn the waiver
"as against public policy." The court in Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l,
Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 363-64 (1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (1lth Cir. 1985), forbid a party to
waive punitive damages simply because that party agreed to arbitrate domestically. See infra
notes 96-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of Willoughby. One may conclude that, if
punitive damages are protected by the same public policy as are treble damages, a party may
not waive rights to the former in international arbitration. See infra note 104. Federal public
policy would then condemn any foreign punitive damage award not in conformity with Ameri-
can law, despite the party's submission to a private international forum. In Newman & Bur-
rows, Consequences of International Arbitration of Antitrust and RICO, N.Y.L.J. Dec. 23,
1985, at I, the authors compare the Mitsubishi claims in international arbitration with claims
based on the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and conclude RICO
claims are also arbitrable in international arbitration (citing Development Bank of the Philip-
pines v. Chemtex Fibers, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding RICO claims interna-
tionally arbitrable)). For a further discussion of Mitsubishi and RICO in international
arbitration, see Newman & Burrows, Will RICO Move Abroad Through International Arbitra-
tion?, N.Y.L.J. Nov. 21, 1985, at I. The authors analogize treble damages under antitrust
statutes to those damages under the RICO statute, as both having a penal rather than a reme-
dial purpose. Newman & Burrows, Consequences of International Arbitration of Antitrust and
RICO, supra, at 2.
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interest in a competitive economy; thus the plaintiff asserting
his rights under the Act has been likened to a private attorney-
general who protects the public's interest." The treble-damages
provision wielded by the private litigant is a chief tool in the
antitrust enforcement scheme, posing a crucial deterrent to po-
tential violators.
The importance of the private damages remedy, however,
does not compel the conclusion that it may not be sought
outside an American court.
86
The Court acknowledged first that the main purpose behind United
States antitrust law is to promote a national interest in a competitive
market. Second, it noted that claims brought and damages awarded
under those laws protect the public's interest. Third, it confirmed that
treble damages are designed to deter certain conduct.87
Public policy supporting punitive damages is similar to that behind
treble damages. Punitive damage awards, like treble damage awards,
promote a national interest-civil punishment for egregious wrongful
conduct. Punitive damages, like treble damages, are in excess of com-
86. 105 S. Ct. 3358-59 (quoting American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391
F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968)) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
87. The Court also stated: "Notwithstanding its important incidental policing functions,
the treble-damages cause of action conferred on private parties... seeks primarily to enable an
injured competitor to gain compensation for that injury." Id. at 3359. This Comment dis-
agrees. See supra note 75. If the Sherman Act is designed to protect and promote the public's
interest, treble damages cannot have only an "incidental policing function" and a primary
remedial function. Their primary effect must be to deter the anticompetitive wrongdoer from
future public harm, because the compensatory portion of the award is only one-third of the
total.
There is nothing incidental about punitive damages' policing functions; both deterrence
and punishment are essential functions which, in fact, protect the public. Therefore, the two
types of damages are similar in domestic case law and should be treated similarly in interna-
tional proceedings. For example, in Perma-Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,
392 U.S. 134 (1968), a dealers' action against Midas Muffler Shops and others for illegal con-
spiracy, the Court stated:
The purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action
will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in
violation of the antitrust laws. The plaintiff who reaps the award of treble damages
may be no less morally reprehensible than the defendant, but the law encourages his
suit to further the overriding public policy in favor of competition.
Id. at 138-39; see also 21 CONG. REc. 3146-47, 3150, 4091 (1890).
Alternatively, if the Mitsubishi Court decided treble damages are suitable for international
arbitration because they primarily compensate the plaintiff, then the Court may disapprove
punitive damage issues in international arbitrations because the latter are always awarded in
addition to compensatory damages. See Lawlor v. National Screen Serv., 349 U.S. 322, 329
(1955); Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825
(1955); Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252 U.S. 436, 440
(1920).
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pensation and are awarded to protect the public's interest rather than the
wronged party's. Like treble damages, punitive damage awards made
public deter the wrongdoer and potential wrongdoers from opprobrious
conduct and thus protect the public from future harm.88 Thus, if the
United States Supreme Court allows international arbitrators to award
treble damages, and treble damages and punitive damages are designed
to effectuate similar purposes, then the Court would probably allow in-
ternational arbitrators to award punitive damages.
b. other federal court decisions
In 1983, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina decided Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 89 In
1982, Willis invested funds in an account the defendant broker managed.
The broker's agents periodically assured Willis his account's status was
satisfactory. In fact, the account had suffered substantial losses. Willis
charged the broker with fraud, fraud in the inducement and breach of
fiduciary duty.90 The court stayed adjudication pending arbitration, de-
spite the fact that Willis' claims included a prayer for punitive
damages.91
Willis objected to a motion to compel arbitration, arguing that the
parties' contract was governed by New York law and New York law has
not, to date, recognized an arbitral award of punitive damages. Arbitra-
tion of the dispute, Willis argued, violated public policy; however, the
court held otherwise.
92
The court reasoned that since the arbitration clause was extraordi-
narily broad, the arbitrators had an extensive range of powers.9 3 Relying
on the national policy encouraging arbitration embodied in the Federal
Arbitration Act, the court stated, "[i]f an issue is arbitrable under federal
law, it remains so despite contrary state law." 94 Although the court ex-
pressly failed to analyze the policies underlying punitive damage awards,
88. For example, Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1984), held
that a physician is liable to an injured patient for punitive damages awarded in an arbitration.
For a discussion of Baker, see supra note 67. Baker has been widely reported in periodicals
which surely reach the California medical community. Certainly physicians are deterred from
future injurious conduct by the threat of an arbitrator's ability to award and enforce punitive
damages for that conduct.
89. 569 F. Supp. 821 (M.D.N.C. 1983).
90. Id. at 822.
91. Id. at 825.
92. Id. at 823.
93. The Willis/Shearson arbitration agreement covered "'any controversy arising out of
or relating to . . .' the account." Id. (emphasis in original).
94. The court also noted that because the parties' business transactions were interstate,
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it found "no public policy reason persuasive enough to justify prohibiting
arbitrators from resolving issues of punitive damages submitted by the
parties.""5
The following year, the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Alabama adopted the position taken by the Willis court
and in 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed. In Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima International,
Inc.,96 the court confirmed an arbitral award of punitive damages based
on fraud in the inducement or performance of a subcontract. The court
held that because the Willoughby dispute arose from an interstate trans-
action, the Federal Arbitration Act applied and federal arbitration poli-
cies governed the award.97
Willoughby Roofing, a subcontractor from Georgia, agreed with
Kajima, a general contractor from Alabama, to construct and install a
roof for a building Kajima was erecting in Alabama. Relying on
Kajima's original specifications, Willoughby prepared a bid which
Kajima accepted. Kajima then materially altered its plans. Willoughby
tried to renegotiate but Kajima cancelled and gave the contract to an-
other subcontractor.9"
The Willoughby/Kajima arbitration agreement was broad and
vested the arbitrators with authority to decide virtually any claim that
could arise in relation to a roofing subcontract.99 The arbitrators deter-
mined that Kajima misrepresented material facts and willfully deceived
and induced Willoughby's reliance, causing damages.100 Punitive dam-
ages comprised most of Willoughby's award.101
the Federal Arbitration Act applied and preempted New York state law which would have
made the controversy nonarbitrable. Id. at 823-24.
95. Id. at 824.
96. 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (1lth Cir. 1985).
97. Id. at 356 n.5, 359.
98. Id. at 355. The Eleventh Circuit's opinion stated: "In light of the federal policy favor-
ing arbitration at work here our task is to remove all doubt in favor of the arbitrator's author-
ity to award a particular remedy." 776 F.2d at 270. The court of appeals opinion affirmed the
district court holding and discussed and dismissed Kajima's claim that the parties' contract
contained a termination clause which limited damage awards to actual damages for all claims.
Id. at 270-71.
99. The Kajima/Willoughby arbitration agreement submitted to the arbitrators "[a]ll
claims, disputes, and other matters in question arising out of, or relating to, this Agreement or
a Work Assignment or the breach thereof, except with respect to matters for which the Archi-
tect's decision shall be final and binding as provided in this Agreement." Id. at 355-56.
100. Id.
101. The arbitrators awarded Willoughby $150,000 in unspecified damages which, at the
court's request, were broken down into $41,091.25 compensatory damages and $108,908.75
punitive damages. Id. at 356.
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The Willoughby court employed the reasoning from Willis to con-
firm the award. Although state substantive law governed the issues sub-
mitted to arbitration, federal law governed "the resolution of issues
concerning the arbitration provision's interpretation, construction, valid-
ity, revocability, and enforceability." 1 "2
In its decision, the Willoughby court stated:
[There is no] reason to believe that the purposes of punitive
awards-punishment of the present wrongdoer and deterrence of
others who might otherwise engage in similar conduct-will not
be furthered by arbitral awards every bit as much as by formal
judicial awards. Indeed, an arbitrator steeped in the practice of
a given trade is often better equipped than a judge not only to
decide what behavior so transgresses the limits of acceptable
commercial practice in that trade as to warrant a punitive
award, but also to determine the amount of punitive damages
needed to (1) adequately deter others in the trade from engag-
ing in similar misconduct, and (2) punish the particular defend-
ant in accordance with the magnitude of his misdeed. 103
Finally, the court noted that if public policy prohibits arbitrators from
awarding such damages, a plaintiff might contractually waive his right to
punitive damages by entering into an arbitration agreement.Y°4
Although Willis and Willoughby stand alone, they demonstrate the
growing trend in the federal arena towards granting punitive damage
powers to arbitrators. Both courts recognized the liberal federal policy
of delegating traditional judicial powers to arbitrators when possible, and
generally encouraging arbitration as an alternative form of dispute reso-
lution. The Mitsubishi decision reflects the American public policy
which favors resolution of claims containing punitive-like damages in in-
ternational arbitration.
In sum, all three federal court decisions indicate that domestic and
international arbitration awards can include elements of punitive dam-
102. Id. at 359 (citing Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821, 823-24
(M.D.N.C. 1983)) (emphasis omitted).
103. Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 363 (emphasis added).
104. Id. According to the court, a plaintiff's claims of tort and breach of contract with a
prayer for punitive damages would necessitate two proceedings with some issues submitted to
arbitrators and some reserved to the courts. The court called this "a wasteful exercise." Id. at
363-64. Yet the court failed to fully realize that ifa party waived the right to trial by agreeing
in writing to submit all claims to arbitration, he may not maintain a separate court proceeding.
A court would dismiss the claimant's complaint because he agreed to arbitrate. He has not
transferred punitive damages to another forum; rather, he has indeed waived any right he had
to punitive damages.
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ages and still be consistent with the public policy behind such damages.
This consensus of American federal law provides little or no bar to the
enforcement of an international arbitral award of punitive damages.
3. Conflict between punitive damage awards and arbitration
A claimant anxious to resolve a problem and not wedded to a court
system with its restrictive evidentiary and procedural rules may find arbi-
tration ideal. Yet the appealing informal rules of domestic and interna-
tional arbitration limit the system as a substitute for adjudication,
especially where civil punishment is involved. Of course, all rules and
procedures in an arbitration are subject to the parties' agreement.
10 5
For example, because arbitration decisions are rarely published, a
punitive damage award from a private arbitral forum may fail to warn
potential wrongdoers of the penalty imposed for the conduct. A court
decision, on the other hand, is usually published and made public, warn-
ing wrongdoers about possible penalties.' 6
As another example, when an award-holder petitions a court to con-
firm an award, a dissatisfied party may move to have the award vacated.
One reason for having the award vacated is that an arbitrator has ex-
ceeded his powers under the agreement or under laws governing the ar-
bitration.10 7  Thus, in a jurisdiction where punitive damages are
nonarbitrable, an award including them may be vacated. 08
Because arbitration association rules do not usually require that ar-
bitrators have a legal background, they may be businesspersons, adminis-
trators, lawyers or retired judges.'0 9 The arbitrator will not necessarily
make decisions based upon legal precedent; his or her own notions of
105. See supra note 29.
106. Id. Some foreign countries do report arbitration decisions. See supra note 30 for com-
ments of the ICC on publishing arbitration decisions.
107. See supra notes 29 and 73.
108. See supra note 29. Courts are rarely willing to review the merits of an arbitration. The
review defeats the time-saving and cost-saving benefits of arbitration, clogs the court docket,
denies the parties freedom to contract for arbitration and fails to reflect the public policy of
confidence in alternative dispute resolution. Also, if an arbitral punitive award is excessive, a
reviewing court may fail to overturn it. "An award made in accordance with all legal require-
ments is a final and binding determination of the dispute. Once a final and binding award has
been made, all issues settled by the award are no longer subject to further litigation or arbitra-
tion." 3 LAW. ARB. LETTER No. 27, Sept. 1979, at 1. This rule has led to the decision that
arbitral awards almost always bind third parties who are not privy to the arbitration process
under the doctrines of res judicata, id. at 1-5, and collateral estoppel. 8 LAW. AR. LETTER
No. 1, Mar. 1984, at 1.
109. AAA Rules 12 and 19 state that the qualifications of arbitrators are minimal. The
rules require only that arbitrators must be neutral and subject to disqualification for bias.
Arbitration Rules, supra note 29, at 193-94.
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fairness may govern the entire process. Therefore, the binding arbitral
decision may negate precedent which strongly favors one party's case
and which might have won the day in court. Since the amount of puni-
tive damages is awarded according to the arbitrator's idea of what is eq-
uitable, there may be no check on the arbitrary or unfair imposition of
excessive damages. 110
Because the use of arbitration has increased, many countries includ-
ing the United States have restricted its application to certain subject
matter. National laws declare specific issues "nonarbitrable," and re-
serve them for resolution through more conventional domestic adjudica-
tion.1" Although United States federal courts have declared punitive
damages arbitrable, they may be nonarbitrable in other countries. Even
if arbitrable, the punitive award from an arbitration may be unenforce-
able if the court which must enforce the award holds that punitive dam-
ages violate public policy.
However, a punitive arbitral award does serve both purposes behind
the damages. The award, like a court judgment, punishes the wrongdoer
by awarding extra-compensating damages to the injured party. The
award also deters at least one tortfeasor-the party in the arbitration-
from similar future conduct.
The arbitral forum may also provide a more progressive solution to
a party's problem than would a court. For example, there is a growing
practice in American states to have the punitive portion of a punitive
damage award deposited into a public fund or into a community service
organization's budget."1 2 An arbitrator may fashion the award to fit the
110. See supra note 13, for a discussion of the Garrity court's concern with arbitrators'
imposition of punishment.
111. See supra note 74.
112. In Colorado, limitations on punitive damages have been set by the state legislature and
one-third of a punitive damage award goes to the Water Conservation Board Construction
Fund. Colo. H.B. 1197, 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985). In Florida, a flexible cap on punitive
damages has been set at around three times the amount of compensatory damages, and 60% of
any punitive award goes to the Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund or a general state fund.
Fla. S.B. 465, 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985). In Illinois, a court has the discretion to distribute a
punitive award between the plaintiff, his or her attorney and the state's Department of Reha-
bilitation Services. Ill. S.B. 1200, 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985). Finally, in Iowa, 75% or more of
a punitive damage award must be paid to the state's Civil Reparations Trust Fund, except
where the action resulted from a tort specifically directed at the particular plaintiff. Iowa S.B.
2265, 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985). All 1986 enactments are discussed in Alliance of American
Insurers (Schaumburg, Illinois), Civil Justice Enactments: 1986 Session, prepared July 11,
1986 (copy on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). Also, a bill called the "Litigation
Abuse Reform Act of 1986" is before Congress which proposes a limitation on awards of
punitive damages. S. 2046, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2121 (1986). The bill states, in pertinent
part:
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circumstances. Thus, the arbitrator could order that the wrongdoer pay
the portion of damages over compensation to an organization which will
work to correct the injustice complained about in the arbitration-
whether for tort law reform, improvement of a product line or social
work.
III. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
ARBITRAL AWARDS
Domestic disputes involving punitive damage claims may have in-
ternational implications. Arbitration may result in a punitive damage
award that a party needs to enforce in a foreign State. For example, a
Swiss broker mismanages an American investor's account;113 an Indian
contractor fraudulently subcontracts with an American roof builder for
construction in India;" 4 a doctor in New Zealand contracts for and neg-
ligently performs surgery on an American patient;' or a German pub-
lisher maliciously harasses an American author while under contract to
publish the author's books.' 16 Since arbitration is favored abroad as it is
in the United States,' 17 it is probable that such agreements between for-
eign parties will include a clause to arbitrate internationally "any dispute
arising out of" the contract. And, where United States federal law gov-
erns the dispute, arbitrators abroad may decide punitive damage claims.
A. The 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards
There are no uniform procedures for enforcing an international arbi-
(c)(1) Punitive damages awarded in any civil action to which this chapter applies
shall be paid to the clerk of the court in which the action is pending.
(2) Such awards of punitive damages shall be transmitted promptly to the
Treasurer of the United States, for the use of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts and the Federal Judicial Center.
Id. § 2126.
113. See Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821 (M.D.N.C. 1983).
See also supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
114. See Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D.
Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985). See also supra text accompanying notes 96-
98.
115. See Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1984). See also supra
note 67.
116. See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831
(1976). See supra note 67.
117. "Arbitration has emerged as the preferred remedy for resolving private international
commercial disputes." Carbonneau, Rendering Arbitral Awards With Reasons: The Elabora-
tion of a Common Law of International Transactions, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 579, 579-
80 & n.1 (1985). See also Bockstiegel, States in the International Arbitral Process, 2 ARB.
INT'L 22, 22 (1986).
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tral award. The successful party must obtain an enforcement order or
judgment from a national court, usually in the jurisdiction where the ar-
bitration occurred. Then the party attempts to have the order "recog-
nized" by the courts in the country or countries where it must be
enforced. Recognition and enforcement are defined as follows:
[Courts may give one of two effects to a foreign decision. The
court may recognize the judgment, or it may additionally en-
force it. If it limits its action to recognition, it decides that
there is an issue, or issues, which do not need to be relitigated.
If it enforces the judgment, it goes further and grants to the
successful party some part or all of the judgment decreed by the
foreign court.'
18
Bilateral treaties between foreign States have unified some proce-
dures for enforcement, yet they bind only the two countries which sign
the treaty.'1 9 To expand enforcement, the Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards12 was ratified in
1958. The Convention encourages arbitration of international commer-
cial disputes and provides uniform standards for enforcing the resulting
awards. It obligates its signatories, subject to certain exceptions, to rec-
ognize and enforce an arbitral award rendered in a foreign State, as if
that award was a domestic judgment rendered by the recognizing
State. 2 ' The Convention's goal, then, is to expedite enforcement of and
improve compliance with international arbitral awards.
The United States acceded to the Convention in 1970 by incorporat-
ing it into the Federal Arbitration Act.'22 The Act governs all arbitra-
tion agreements arising out of a commercial transaction, contract or
118. R. FOLSOM, M. GORDON & J. SPANOGLE, JR., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSAC-
TIONS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 347 (1986) [hereinafter FOLSOM & GORDON].
119. For example, Algeria has Judicial Treaties with Morocco (Mar. 15, 1963), Tunisia
(July 26, 1963), Mauritania (Dec. 3, 1969), the Democratic Republic of Germany (Dec. 2,
1972) and France (Aug. 27, 1964); Libya has bilateral treaties with Tunisia (June 14, 1961) and
Morocco (Dec. 22, 1962). INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Na-
tional Reports: Algeria, Libya [1979] 4 Y.B. COM. ARB. 20, 160.
120. June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
121. The Convention applies in all cases if the arbitration takes place in a (contracting)
State other than that State which invokes the arbitration agreement. It also applies if the
agreement is invoked in the same State where the arbitration takes place, and "(a) if at least
one of the parties is a foreign national and/or (b) if the underlying transaction involves a
subject matter which has contacts with one or more foreign States." van den Berg, Should an
International Arbitrator Apply the New York Arbitration Convention of 1958?, in THE ART OF
ARBITRATION, supra note 25, at 39, 45.
122. Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08
(1982)). See Quigley, Accession By the United States to the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049 (1961).
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agreement between a United States citizen and a foreign national. It also
governs agreements between United States citizens where the award will
be performed or enforced abroad or has some reasonable relationship
with one or more foreign States. 123 Thus, if an American company or
individual contracts with a foreign State or even with a United States
citizen who owns assets abroad for any kind of services or goods, the
Convention governs their agreement to arbitrate disputes.
Some provisions of the Convention limit the effectiveness of its rec-
ognition and enforcement procedures. The International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) has stated: "The Convention provides just a few, nar-
rowly drawn exceptions to a national authority's obligation to compel
arbitration but offers broader grounds for denying recognition and en-
forcement of an arbitral award." '124 The first important limit on the Con-
vention's authority is Article VII, paragraph 1, which states that the
Convention "shall not affect the validity of multilateral or bilateral agree-
ments concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards en-
tered into by the contracting States."' 25 Thus, an enforcing national
court may determine that the Convention recognizes an arbitration
award which conflicts with bilateral agreements between countries with a
relation to the dispute. With this determination, Article VII allows the
enforcing court to use less effective rules in unfamiliar treaties to enforce
the award. Even more damaging to the arbitration, following Article
VII's language, the bilateral treaties may allow the court to refuse recog-
nition of the award. 26
123. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982).
124. ICC Mitsubishi Brief, supra note 30, at 27. Aside from the exceptions to enforcement
discussed in the text of this Comment, there are essentially five grounds for nonenforcement
under the Convention:
(a) the arbitration agreement was invalid;
(b) a party was unable to present his case;
(c) the award does not comply with the terms of the submission;
(d) the appointment of the arbitrators or the arbitral procedure was not in accord-
ance with the agreement of the parties;
(e) the award was not yet binding on the parties, or had been set aside in the country
where it was made.
Sanders, A Twenty Years' Review of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign ArbitralAwards, 13 INT'L LAW. 269, 272 (1979). "Submission" as a ground forjuris-
diction signifies that the parties, especially the defendant, concede that the court is competent
to deal with their dispute. J.A.C. THOMAS, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 37 (1955).
125. Convention, supra note 19, art. VII, para. 1. See van den Berg, supra note 121, at 43.
126. van den Berg, supra note 121, at 43. See Derains, France as a Place For International
Arbitration, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION, supra note 25, at 111, 116. If parties must join in
an agreement which provides for arbitration in a nonsignatory State to the Convention, they
should set the arbitration in a country which at least has a bilateral treaty with a signatory
State to the Convention. In other words, suppose a United States company contracts and
agrees to arbitrate with a Turkish company. Turkey is not a signatory to the Convention. If
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The second major limit on enforcement under the Convention, the
public policy exception, is contained in Article V, paragraph 2, which
states:
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may
also be refused if the competent authority in the country where
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition and enforcement of the award would
be contrary to the public policy of that country.
127
The impact of Article V(2)(a) is demonstrated by the following ex-
amples of subject matter considered nonarbitrable under American law,
and which, until recently, barred enforcement of a foreign award: viola-
tions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,128 violations of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act 129 and tort or contract actions involving claims of
punitive damages.13 1 In other words, an arbitral award which purported
to decide some American federal securities or antitrust issues or which
awarded punitive damages would have been invalidated by an enforcing
court. American judicial decisions in the last few years have altered the
rules that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the statutory
violations and that state and federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over punitive damages.
131
As an example of foreign nonarbitrable subject matter, laws in
France, Germany and Switzerland state that antitrust claims are nonar-
bitrable.'l 2 Austrian law forbids arbitration of whether a party owes a
gambling debt.133 Any award which punished the gambling debtor or
Turkey has a treaty governing enforcement of foreign arbitral awards with any State which has
signed the Convention, the arbitration award may be recognized in the signatory country and
enforced in Turkey by means of the bilateral treaty. Id. See FoLSoM & GORDON, supra note
118, at 374-75.
127. Convention, supra note 19, art. V, para. 2 (emphasis added).
128. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-78 (1982). Federal statutory claims under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States federal courts. Id § 77b
(1982). See supra note 74.
129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. Federal antitrust claims under the Sherman Act were also under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States federal courts. Id. § 1. See supra text accompanying
notes 77-87 for a discussion of Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105
S. Ct. 3346 (1985), the case that changed this rule.
130. See supra note 67 and text accompanying notes 89-104.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 74-104.
132. Newman & Burrows, Consequences of InternationalArbitration ofAntitrust and RICO,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1985, at 1, 2 nn.26-29.
133. In the matter at the Oberster Gerichtshof [Supreme Court], May 11, 1983, INTERNA-
TIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Court Decisions on the New York Conven-
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decided the anticompetitive issues would be automatically void.'3 4
Because punitive damages are now arbitrable in most American ju-
risdictions, Article V's public policy limitation is the Convention's poten-
tial barrier to enforcing a punitive damage award. As the ICC has noted:
"Arbitral tribunals are not likely to enforce agreements-or require the
payment of damages for breach of agreements-'when a mandatory na-
tional law in effect at the place of performance forbids such perform-
ance.' "135 Since recognition and enforcement may be refused for
nonarbitrable subject matter or public policy conflicts, it is vital that a
contracting party realize initially that an award may be worthless in cer-
tain situations. When not recognized, an arbitral award simply Will not
be enforced. A successful party who walks away from an international
arbitration with a punitive damage award may encounter this scenario
when he claims the sum from a country which will not honor the award.
B. Confusion Surrounding the Public Policy Exception
Parties have tried to employ the Convention's public policy excep-
tion to avoid enforcement of arbitral awards in many situations: where
national political policies or political conflict arguably justified an act
which led to an award;136 where procedural due process violations re-
sulted in an unfair award; 137 and where an award failed to state reasons
for the arbitrators' final decisions. 138
tion 1958 [1985] 10 Y.B. COM. ARB. 421. An Austrian party successfully defeated an award
when a Dutch party brought an enforcement proceeding. The Supreme Court affirmed a lower
court's holding that the underlying contract violated public policy. Id. The contract terms
provided for payment by margin, rather than on delivery, and thus violated Austrian foreign
exchange law. Id. at 422. The lower court had found no distinction between domestic and
"international" public policy, and rendered the award invalid. Id. at 422-23.
134. See Convention, supra note 19, at art. V(2)(a).
135. ICC Mitsubishi Brief, supra note 30, at 23 (citing ICC ARBITRATION, supra note 6,
§ 17.04, at 89).
136. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier
(RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974). For a discussion of Parsons, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 148-56.
137. Firm P (U.S.A.) v. Firm F (F.R.G.), Apr. 3, 1975, reported in INTERNATIONAL
COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Court Decisions on New York Convention 1958:
Federal Republic Germany [1977] 2 Y.B. COM. ARB. 241. But cf Leopold Lazarus Ltd.
(U.K.) v. Chrome Resources S.A. (Switz.), Sept. 17, 1976, reported in INTERNATIONAL COUN-
CIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Court Decisions on New York Convention 1958: Switzer-
land [1979] 4 Y.B. COM. ARB. 311-13 (irregularities in arbitration procedure did not constitute
"a violation on fundamental principles of the Swiss legal order, hurting intolerably the feeling
of justice").
138. S.A. Tradax Export (Panama) v. S.p.a. Carapelli (Italy), Oct. 22, 1976, reported in
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Court Decisions on New York
Convention: Italy [1978] 3 Y.B. COM. ARB. 279, 280. Parties have made other attempts at
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Conflict over what constitutes a proper public policy defense is
great, and the question of whether the purposes supporting punitive dam-
ages violate the public policy of other countries is substantial. Parties in
conflict over the Convention's authority to render an award unenforce-
able should be aware of two principles. First, the opinion that domestic
public policy is not the same as international notions of public policy is
widely accepted and militates against a court's liberal use of the public
policy exception. Second, a punitive damage award, which civilly penal-
izes a wrongdoer, may be considered a foreign penal judgment which is
unenforceable in the courts of another State.
1. The definition of "public policy" under the Convention
The "public policy" language in Article V has been interpreted not
to mean parochial or domestic policy of the enforcing State, but rather to
mean "international public policy." '139 Parochial policies are unique to
the State, whereas international policy encompasses essential principles
of international law-fairness, morality and legality."o Still, the interna-
tional element is subject to various interpretations. Indeed, some coun-
tries insist on injecting parochial policies to defeat an award. This
treatment vitiates "the general pro-enforcement bias" of the
Convention. 141
using the public policy exception for lack of impartial arbitrators, illegal behavior of a party,
contracts made under duress and unavailability of evidence due to national security. See IN-
TERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Court Decisions on the New York
Convention: Commentary [1986] 11 Y.B. COM. ARB. 464-68.
139. See A.J. VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958:
TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 360-68 (1981). Dr. van den Berg has also
commented on the impracticality of an international arbitrator's attempts at guessing which
public policy would best apply in a controversial situation. van den Berg, supra note 121, at
48-49. Dr. van den Berg believes an international arbitrator cannot practically apply, in addi-
tion to the law governing the arbitration, the public policy of the countries in which enforce-
ment of the arbitral award may be sought. Dr. van den Berg states:
Even if these countries could be identified to the arbitrator before the award is ren-
dered, a cumulative application of the rules of public policy of several countries
would be both impractical and improper. It would be impractical especially because
rules of public policy, usually developed by case law with all kinds of subtle distinc-
tions, are difficult to determine. To charge the arbitrator (or the parties) with the
burden of finding out all the possibly relevant rules of public policy of other countries
is bound to result in misapprehension and delays in arbitration; the arbitrator has
already work enough to determine the public policy of his forum.
Id. This is because it is difficult to determine where the award must be enforced. Id. at 48.
See also Bernini, The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards by National Judiciaries: A Trial
of the New York Convention's Ambit and Workability, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION, supra
note 25, at 51, 59-61.
140. See A.J. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 139, at 360-61.
141. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 973.
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In 1958, some signatories to the Convention were concerned that
judges might apply parochial policies of their respective countries when
asked to recognize arbitral awards and that the courts could thereby
thwart international arbitration agreements. 142 A commentator recently
downplayed this concern as "unwarranted since.., the courts generally
use the distinction between domestic and international public policy,"
thus avoiding "undesirable consequences." 143 This opinion has largely
proven to be true. However, a potential threat that a court will misuse
the exception and apply domestic policies still exists.
In the United States, President Johnson presented the Convention to
the Senate with a memorandum from the State Department analyzing
the Convention's articles. 144 The memorandum mentioned that both the
nonarbitrability provision of Article V(2)(a) and the public policy excep-
tion of Article V(2)(b) "would give the courts to which application is
made considerable latitude in refusing enforcement."1 4 Backed by this
concern, the Solicitor General of the United States concluded that "the
Senate, in consenting to accession, understood that the Convention
would not require United States courts to enforce arbitration agreements
in a limited class of matters as to which arbitration would interfere with
fundamental policies of the United States."'46 If this advice is followed,
United States courts would have considerable flexibility in applying the
Convention's provisions and may refuse enforcement by recognizing
fundamental domestic policies which conflict with the award.
2. American judicial interpretations of public policy
under the Convention
More often than not, United States courts have refused to apply Ar-
ticle V's "catch-all" public policy provision to invalidate an award.' 47
142. G.W. HAIGHT, CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOR-
EIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS: SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF RECORD OF UNITED NATIONS CONFER-
ENCE 66 (1958).
143. A.J. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 139, at 368-69.
144. S. EXEC. Doc. No. E, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1968). Such memoranda are entitled to
great weight in the interpretation of a treaty. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457
U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982) (female employees of wholly-owned subsidiary of Japanese trading
company brought unsuccessful class action suit against Sumitomo for violation of Title VII of
Civil Rights Act of 1964, because terms of United States-Japan Treaty provided defense to
discrimination suit).
145. S. EXEC. DOC. No. E, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 21 (1968) (emphasis added).
146. United States Mitsubishi Brief, supra note 30, at 28 (emphasis added). See also the
United States Supreme Court's opinion in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953). "[E]xcept
as forbidden by some public policy, the tendency of the law is to apply in contract matters the
law which the parties intended to apply." Id. at 588-89.
147. See generally Comment, The Public Policy Defense to Recognition and Enforcement of
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For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
in the 1974 case of Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe
Generale de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 148 rejected the public policy
defense where the Arab-Israeli Six Day War forced an American con-
tractor to cease building a paper mill in Egypt. In Parsons, an American
corporation claimed that the severed American-Egyptian relations re-
sulted in withdrawal of financial support for the building project, and
therefore justified its nonperformance of contractual obligations.149
An arbitral panel from the ICC Court granted the Egyptian party
damages for breach of contract. In the judicial confirmation proceeding,
the corporation argued that because of American-Egyptian tensions, it
was forced to breach the contract. Therefore, an international arbitral
award for damages against the corporation was void under the public
policy exception. 150 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted summary judgment to the defendant Egyp-
tian corporation and confirmed the award."' The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, stating the claimant "quite
plainly misse[d] the mark."1 2
The court decided that the public policy defense could be invoked
"only where enforcement would violate the forum State's most basic no-
tions of morality and justice." '53 It further held:
To read the public policy defense as a parochial device protec-
tive of national political interests would seriously undermine
the Convention's utility. This provision was not meant to en-
shrine the vagaries of international politics under the rubric of
"public policy." Rather, a circumscribed public policy doctrine
was contemplated by the Convention's framers and every indi-
cation is that the United States, in acceding to the Convention,
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 228 (1977). See, e.g., La Societe Nationale
pour ]a Recherche, la Production, le Transport, la Transformation et la Commercialisation des
Hydrocarbures, ["Sonatrach"] v. Shaheen Natural Resources Co., 585 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (arbitration award held not contrary to United States public policy and recognized and
enforceable under Convention), aff'd, 733 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 251
(1984).
148. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
149. Id. at 974.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 971.
152. Id. at 974.
153. Id. (citing Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975)). The court in
Fotochrome expressly found it unnecessary to determine "whether the Bankruptcy Act in-
volves a 'public policy' [in requiring equal treatment of creditors] which is contrary to enforce-
ment of arbitral awards under the Convention." Fotochrome, 517 F.2d at 516.
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meant to subscribe to this supranational emphasis. 154
In Parsons, the arbitrators had also refused to grant a continuance to
accommodate a key witness. The court of appeals, however, still found
no public policy reason by which it could reject the award.'55 Although
the lack of a key witness could substantially prejudice a case, the court
did not find this procedural issue important enough to implicate due pro-
cess or fairness concerns.I56 Thus, for this court of appeals, the definition
of public policy included only a consideration of basic norms of fairness,
or solely international concerns.
In the 1980 case of Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v.
Southwire Co.,157 a French company and an American company agreed
to have their disputes governed by "Georgia law to the extent that it was
in accordance with French law." '158 The arbitrator had applied the
French variable interest rate of nine and one-half percent to ten and one-
half percent per year to the damages he awarded. The party against
whom damages were awarded claimed the award was unenforceable
under Article V(2)(b) of the Convention because the rate was "usurious"
and violated United States (domestic) public policy.159
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Geor-
gia applied the Parsons standard of "most basic notions of morality and
justice" and enforced, but modified, the award. The court found that the
interest rate matched the rates in some American states, so the rate alone
did not violate public policy.'60 It also noted that the choice of law noti-
fied the complaining party that French laws could be applied. 6' What
the district court could not accept was the arbitrator's decision to apply
French law to increase the interest rate by five percent two months after
the date of the award. The district court held that this portion of the
award was impermissible under American law and egregious enough to
invoke the Convention's public policy exception.' 62 The court reasoned:
An award of interest is made so that a person wrongfully de-
prived of the use of his money should be made whole for his
loss. A penalty, on the other hand, is a sum of money which
the law exacts by way of punishment for doing something that
154. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 974.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 484 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
158. Id. at 1067 (emphasis in original).
159. Id. at 1068.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1067.
162. Id. at 1069.
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is prohibited or omitting to do something that is required to be
done. The law does not lightly impose penalties. A foreign law
will not be enforced if it is penal only and relates to the punishing
of public wrongs as contradistinguished from the redressing of
private injuries. Agreements to pay fixed sums as damages
plainly without reasonable relation to any probable damage
which may follow will not be enforced.
163
The Laminoirs court decided without evidentiary basis that the in-
creased rate was a penalty in excess of compensation and that it bore "no
reasonable relation to any damage resulting from delay in recovery of the
sums awarded." 16" Although this case has not been reversed on appeal,
several aspects of the decision are vulnerable to criticism. First, the court
incorrectly reviewed the arbitrator's decision to apply French law to the
award. The arbitrator has the exclusive authority to make this decision
at the time he decides the merits of the case.1 65 Second, the court's deci-
sion that the increased interest did not relate to the damages (determined
by the arbitrator) was not based on a review of the principles supporting
the French law that the arbitrator applied. 166 If a court looks into the
merits of an arbitral dispute, certainly the parties' choice of law should
influence the review. For this reason, the court should not have labeled
the problematic portion of the award a "penalty" and rendered it unen-
forceable. Finally, the court could not have known whether the "pen-
alty" bore a reasonable relationship to the damages because the court
was not the arbiter of justice which heard the evidence.
Laminoirs is one of the few cases in which the Convention's public
policy exception has nullified any portion of an award. Yet it is difficult
to see how the French interest penalties fail to comply with the enforcing
American court's interpretation of international public policy. To ana-
lyze whether the award violated the public policy of Article V, the Lami-
noirs court compared the variable rate to domestic rates in individual
American states and found no violation because that rate existed in some
American jurisdictions. The court then found that the increased rate met
the public policy standards of the Convention because it was a penalty,
and was therefore inconsistent with domestic law.
One must wonder whether the court even considered international
163. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
164. Id.
165. See supra notes 6 & 30.
166. Laminoirs, 484 F. Supp. at 1069. The Laminoirs opinion quoted the French statute
which allowed the increased interest. Nowhere does the opinion discuss whether the purpose
of the statute was to penalize. Id.
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public policy when it refused to enforce the violative portion of the
award. If the Laminoirs court only compared the arbitrator's ruling with
domestic law, as the opinion seems to indicate, then only certain courts
will give the Convention's exception a "pro-enforcement bias," and
award-holding parties could then be vulnerable to an enforcing court's
whim.1
67
A penalty of punitive damages in an award could similarly fail to
conform to a foreign State's interpretation of domestic or international
public policy. The enforcing court could, therefore, nullify a valid award
under Article V of the Convention. This possibility is especially threat-
ening where a foreign court could cite United States case law-Lami-
noirs-to support the nullification. f
3. Interpretations of public policy under the Convention in
arbitrations and foreign states
In July 1985, an American company (buyer) brought an action in
India's High Court of Delhi to have an arbitral award enforced against
the Steel Authority of India Ltd. (seller). 168 The High Court found that
the buyer could not collect money damages arbitrators had awarded for
the seller's breach of contract because the award violated public policy
under Article V of the Convention. 169
The parties had contracted through correspondence in 1977 to have
the seller supply the buyer with 25,000 tons of hot rolled steel sheet coils
in two installments. The letters contained a force majeure clause which
excused delay or excused contractual performance if circumstances be-
yond either party's control prevented performance.170 The contract also
included an arbitration clause which mandated that the parties submit
167. On the other hand, the Laminoirs court may have objected to the arbitrator's choice of
the French increasing interest rate because the parties' agreement designated that the law gov-
erning their dispute should be American law where consistent with French law. The arbitra-
tor's rejection of the parties' primary choice of United States law may have violated the "most
basic notions of morality and justice" and interfered with the international policies of fairness
and freedom to contract which the court intended to protect.
The court's opinion, however, is unclear on this issue. There are other reasons why an
arbitrator might choose to apply an interest rate other than the one applicable under the sub-
stantive law chosen by the parties. An arbitrator is often free to apply procedural law of the
forum (of France, in Laminoirs) to arbitration procedures and damages if those issues are
considered procedural rather than substantive. See supra note 6.
168. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Court Decisions of the
1958 New York Convention: India [1986] 11 Y.B. COM. ARB. 502. At least half of the seller
company was owned by the Indian government. Id.
169. Id. at 507.
170. A force majeure clause "protect[s] the parties in the event that a part of the contract
cannot be performed due to causes which are outside the control of the parties and could not
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any disputes to arbitration before the ICC Court. 71 After the seller de-
livered half of the coils called for in the agreement, the Indian govern-
ment banned the export of hot rolled steel sheet coils.
17 2
The parties resorted to the ICC Court and its arbitrators decided
that the seller had breached the contract. The arbitrators rendered an,
award in favor of the buyer for compensatory damages, interest and
costs. A London court recognized the award as a final judgment and the
buyer proceeded to India to enforce the judgment.
7 3
The High Court of India held that under Indian domestic arbitra-
tion rules, it could review the merits of an arbitration in order to deter-
mine whether the award violated Indian public policy. The court also
held that even after an arbitrator has rendered a valid, enforceable
award, if circumstances arose which make the award violative of public
policy, the court could overturn that award.174 The court decided that
the Indian government had banned steel coil exports for the public good
or for public policy reasons "in view of acute shortage of coils existing in
the country at the relative time."' 75 The court thus held that this domes-
tic policy on foreign exchange controls excused the seller's performance
of the contract, and rendered the foreign award unenforceable.'
76
The court refused to recognize a distinction between domestic and
international public policy, even though the buyer raised the issue. The
court reasoned that the expression "public policy" in Article V of the
Convention "refers to the public policy of the country where enforce-
ment is sought, i.e. India."' 77 Thus, for this court, the domestic controls
be avoided by exercise of due care." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (5th ed. 1979). The
agreement between the parties in the arbitration before the Indian court specifically stated:
If the Seller and/or the Buyer be prevented from discharging its or their obligation
under this agreement ... on account of any ... cause beyond the Seller's or the
Buyer's control and interfering with the production and/or delivery as hereinabove
contemplated, the time for delivery shall be postponed... [and] either the Seller or
Buyer may at their option cancel this agreement ... without, however, any right
against or being responsible to the other party for such cancellation.
Id. at 502. The enforcing court may have taken this liberal clause into account when it decided
the seller's breach was guided by proper public policy. Arguably, almost any cause out of one
party's control could have excused performance, irrespective of public policy considerations.
The court did not address whether the broad clause coupled with domestic policies made the
seller's Article V(2)(b) defense more viable.
171. Id. at 502-03.
172. Id. at 503, 506.
173. Id. at 503.
174. Id. at 506-07.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 507. Because the Indian (enforcing) court voided the award as violating public
policy, the creditor may have no mechanism to enforce the award and the debtor is discharged.
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on foreign exchange met the standards for public policy under the Con-
vention and rendered a valid judgment of money damages unenforceable
in the one State which could enforce the judgment.
Another case arose in 1982 when a Dutch company (seller) con-
tracted to sell pure unrefined maize oil to an Italian company (buyer). 
178
The buyer refused to pay for the oil, arguing its quality was inferior to
that called for in the contract.179
Under an arbitration clause, the parties submitted the dispute to ar-
bitration in Rotterdam. The arbitrators found the oil was of the proper
quality and awarded money damages against the buyer.18 0 When the
seller submitted the award to the Italian court of appeal for enforcement,
the buyer argued the award violated Article V public policy for two rea-
sons: the delivery of goods inferior to those contractually bargained for
was contrary to Italian public policy, and enforcement of the award
would violate public policy by violating Italian foreign exchange laws.'
The Italian appellate court declined to review the merits of the arbi-
trators' decisions and refused to allow the buyer's objections. The court
held that the foreign award "did not violate the basic principles of the
Italian legal system," and did not constitute a violation of Article V pub-
The award-holder may be able to seek redress from the International Court of Justice because
the arbitration resulted in an award against the governmentally-held company. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice is one of the principal organs of the United Nations and has jurisdiction
only over matters which involve a State's national government. Judgments are awarded
against the State itself. See generally S. ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND
How IT WORKS (3d rev. ed. 1973); M. HUDSON, THE WORLD COURT 1921-38: A HAND-
BOOK (5th ed. 1938). Foreign State parties to the statute may recognize the Court's jurisdic-
tion in any legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an interna-
tional obligation.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, Sept. 14, 1929, I.C.3. (ser. D.) No. 1, at 13 art. 36.
See S. ROSENNE, supra, at 177. Thus, with a State's permission, the World Court could hear
questions about the Convention's public policy exception and its application to a punitive dam-
age award.
178. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Court Decisions of the
1958 New York Convention: Italy [1986] 11 Y.B. COM. ARB. 510.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 510-11.
181. Id. at 510. Under Italian law, payment for goods is due only if the goods are actually
imported into Italy. The buyer claimed that because the goods were inferior, they were differ-
ent goods and the contracted-for goods were never actually imported into Italy. Therefore,
according to the buyer, the award demanded that the buyer pay the seller for goods never
received and this payment would violate foreign exchange laws and Italian public policy. Id.
at 510.
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lie policy.182
Thus, foreign exchange controls may constitute public policies
which are so important that their violation excuses breach of contract
(India); yet, in at least some circumstances, foreign exchange controls
will not defeat an arbitral award or excuse a breach of contract (Italy).
These two conflicting decisions demonstrate that in foreign countries, in-
ternational public policy limitations under Article V(2)(b) can be as in-
consistent as those used in American courts and by individual
arbitrators.
In other foreign States, Article V public policy may have little con-
nection to domestic laws. For example, the French find procedural viola-
tions of international public policy in only two categories: where an
arbitrator fails to treat parties equally in an arbitration hearing and
where one party is unable to present its views on every point in dis-
pute. 83 An award made in default of the defendant cannot be enforced
in Spain. 84 In the Federal Republic of Germany, a fundamental due
process violation, such as the arbitrators' failure to forward an important
letter from one party to the other, constitutes an "international" public
policy violation. 85 Moreover, an Austrian court has refused to enforce
an award in which the determination under Dutch law violated Austrian
gambling and betting laws.186
In sum, in Parsons, American-Egyptian diplomatic relations alleg-
edly obstructed a party from performing its contractual obligations; how-
ever, the soured relations failed to constitute a sufficient international
public policy exception which could defeat an arbitral award. This out-
come conflicts with Laminoirs, in which the court held that interest
awarded under French law, which is excessive under American law, ful-
filled the Convention's public policy requirements. In an Indian enforce-
ment action, a domestic governmental directive to ban exports may be
sufficient to render an award unenforceable under the Convention, de-
spite the prominent view that only international policies should excuse
enforcement. Yet, in another State such as Italy, an arbitration award
182. Id. at 511.
183. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, National Reports:
France [1981] 6 Y.B. COM. ARB. 13-14.
184. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Court Decisions on
New York Convention 1958, Commentary [1985] 10 Y.B. COM. ARB. 405 [hereinafter
Commentary].
185. Firm P (U.S.A.) v. Firm F (F.R.G.), Apr. 3, 1975, reported in INTERNATIONAL
COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Court Decisions on New York Convention 1958:
Federal Republic of Germany [1977] 2 Y.B. COM. ARB. 241-42.
186. Commentary, supra note 184, at 407-08.
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will be left intact unless it violates "basic principles" of the domestic legal
system. These cases and the varying definitions of public policy under
other countries' laws amply demonstrate the confusion over the meaning
and proper application of Article V(2)(b).
4. What is international public policy-that which touches a nation's
"most basic notions of morality and justice?"
Even the American Arbitration Association acknowledges that do-
mestic considerations will be addressed by a court in enforcing an
award'87 and labels Article V(2)(b) a "'safety valve,' designed to ensure
that the international arbitration process, when recognized to its fullest
extent, remains consistent with the national policies of the Convention's
signatories."'8 These statements infer that American parochial policies
may block enforcement of an award.
One side of this controversy holds that international public policy is
violated if a foreign State's domestic law would be willfully violated by
enforcement of the arbitral award in that State."8 9 The other side is rep-
resented by a commentator who opines:
The law in force in the forum of the enforcement should be
more or less as beneficial as the treaty law resulting from the
cumulative effects of the New York and Geneva Conventions.
The ideal would be that the law so considered does not contain,
as an obstacle to enforcement, a procedure to nullify the award
or even to accept a nullification pronounced in the country
where the award was rendered.
190
All of the limitations on international public policy discussed above,
in countries other than the United States, could touch "the forum State's
most basic notions of morality and justice." 191 The French, Spanish,
German and Austrian procedural rights listed above are "basic" to inter-
national mores of fairness and morality, so the foreign States consider
them international public policies.
One example of a domestic policy which does not upset uniform
international ideas of morality and justice is illustrated by the fact that
187. Brief for the American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae at 10, Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985) (Nos. 83-1569, 83-
1733).
188. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
189. Schultsz, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Without a Conven-
tion Being Applicable, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION, supra note 25, at 295, 299 n. 13.
190. Theiffry, supra note 28, at 47.
191. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 975-76.
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under French and Italian domestic laws, a domestic arbitral award which
fails to state reasons behind the arbitrator's decision violates public pol-
icy.'92 Under domestic law in most common law countries, arbitral
awards do not traditionally contain reasons. 193 Yet this type of conflict
in arbitration procedure has never been held to violate international pub-
lic policy. This is true even though it touches a vital national concern-
the ability of a reviewing court to review the basis for an arbitral decision
and determine whether the arbitrator decided the case on a proper, legal
basis.
194
The Convention's public policy defense is construed inconsistently
because the area between international and domestic public policies is
gray. Some courts favor a narrow construction which will not impede
the enforcement action, so that awards will be enforced promptly. How-
ever, high interest rates adjudged unenforceable can hardly meet the nar-
row definition or touch "morality" or "justice" issues; therefore, other
courts interpret the provision broadly to protect a party from excessive
foreign penalties. Even if the standard of "morality and justice" were
internationally adopted, different enforcing States' ideas of morality and
justice might inconsistently render awards enforceable or unenforceable.
Because holdings in this area do not clearly distinguish between domestic
and international public policy, it remains to be seen whether policies
such as those behind punitive damages, punishment and deterrence, will
cross the muddy line.
C. Historical Foreign Punitive Judgments and Appropriate Public
Policy Considerations
As a matter of public policy and respect for other nations' court
192. Bernini, supra note 139, at 51, 59.
193. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Court Decisions on the
New York Convention 1958: Commentary, [1985] 10 Y.B. COM. ARB. 406-07. See, e.g., Efxi-
nos Shipping Co. (Greece) v. Rawi Shipping Lines Ltd. (Lebanon), May 2, 1980 (enforcement
of English arbitral award which did not contain written reasons, in violation of Italian arbitra-
tion procedural law held not contrary to Italian international public policy), reported in IN-
TERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARIBTRATION, Court Decisions on New York
Convention 1958. Italy [1983] 8 Y.B. COM. ARB. 381.
194. For example, in Mutual Shipping Corp. v. Bayshore Shipping Co., 1 W.L.R. 625
(1985) (available on LEXIS, Enggen/Cases library), an arbitrator made an accidental error in
calculating damages and included reasons for his decisions in separate papers marked "confi-
dential." Because the papers were inaccessible to the court, the party in whose favor the error
was made argued the court could not correct the error. The court disagreed and held it had
authority to review the confidential reasons. It affirmed that an award without reasons is void
as against public policy because "[flew nations are prepared to lend the power of the state to
enforcing arbitral awards without retaining some right to review the awards themselves." To
avoid injustice, the court sent the award back to the arbitrator for correction.
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systems, it is well established that international tribunals "do not possess
the right to assess or inflict punishment for the wrongful acts of other
States." '19 5 Some courts adhering to this principle have refused to en-
force foreign judgments which included punitive damages. 196 Because
judicial punitive damage judgments have not survived foreign judicial
scrutiny in the past, arbitral awards of punitive damages may also fail in
foreign enforcing courts which consider such awards penal. A foreign
enforcing court determines whether an enforcing arbitral award is penal.
If considered penal, the award may be unenforceable. Therefore, it is
important to determine whether punitive damages are in fact penal.
The United States Supreme Court has defined "penal" and "pen-
alty" as follows:
Strictly and primarily, they denote punishment, whether corpo-
ral or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the State, for a crime
or offence against its laws. But they are also commonly used as
including any extraordinary liability to which the law subjects a
wrongdoer in favor of the person wronged, not limited to the
damages suffered....
Statutes giving a private action against the wrongdoer are
sometimes spoken of as penal in their nature, but in such cases
it has been pointed out that neither the liability imposed nor the
remedy given is strictly penal.97
195. 2 M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 857 (1937). Whiteman also
notes:
There is an apparent desire on the part of international tribunals to avoid punitive or
exemplary damages. The assessment of damages is a civil and not a penal act....
[Ihere is an evident desire on the part of arbitrators or those charged with the settle-
ment of international claims not to allow unreasonable amounts, viz, neither more
than the respondent should or can reasonably be expected to pay nor more than the
claimant should reasonably expect to receive.
3 M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1874 (1943). See Janis, The Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Law: The Antelope's Penal Law Exception, 20 INT'L LAW.
303 (1986), in which the author contends that foreign penalty judgments should be enforced
only where enforcement serves a vital public interest. See also Comment, The Protection of
Trading Interests Act of 1980: Britain's Response to U.S. Extraterritorial Antitrust Enforce-
ment, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 476 (1980). "Foreign governments... have long protested
that ... [treble] damages, which are uniquely American, are penal and hence, should not be
available to private plaintiffs." Id. at 489. See also M. HANCOCK, TORTS IN THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 93 (1942), which states that criminal prosecution under foreign laws is also histori-
cally forbidden.
196. 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 195, at 857. See also M. HANCOCK, supra note 195, at
93.
197. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 667 (1892) (citations omitted). In Huntington, a
New York judgment held a British corporate officer personally liable for corporate debts be-
cause he had signed a false certificate regarding the corporation's affairs. The United States
Supreme Court and the English Privy Council both decided that type of judgment was non-
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Punitive damages certainly denote pecuniary punishment and constitute
liability not limited to the damages suffered. 198 Punitive damages are
also enforced by the State because an American court will enforce a judg-
ment of punitive damages which was validly awarded under American
law.
Some American state courts expressly classify punitive damages and
their analogous cousins, double or treble damages, as penal. 199 Also, pu-
nitive damages are sometimes statutorily awarded in a private plaintiff's
action against a tortfeasor.200 Therefore, under the Supreme Court's def-
inition, punitive damages are penal.201
In the past, punitive judgments have been awarded or enforced on a
case-by-case basis, especially when the civil damages in a judgment did
not conform with the forum's policies.20 2 Traditionally most actions
penal and enforceable outside New York. The English Privy Council's opinion is at 1893 App.
Cas. 150 (P.C.).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 51 & 62.
199. Punitive damages were considered penal in the following cases and annotations: Smith
v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); Grinestaff v. New York Cent. R.R., 253 Ill. App. 589 (1929);
Armbruster v. Chicago R.I. & P. Ry., 166 Iowa 155, 147 N.W. 337 (1914); McLay v. Slade, 48
R.I. 357, 138 A. 212 (1927); Annotation, Judgment of Court of Foreign Country As Entitled to
Enforcement or Extraterritorial Effect in State Court, 13 A.L.R. 4TH 1109 (1982). See Grass,
The Penal Dimensions of Punitive Damages, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 241 (1985), in which
the author concludes punitive damages are penal and their imposition should be accomplished
through the criminal justice system. Cf. Holbein v. Rigot, 245 So. 2d 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1971); Annotation, Requirement of Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Judgment for Punitive
Damages, 44 A.L.R. 3D 960 (1972). Double or treble damages were considered penal in the
following cases: Consolidated Copper Mines Corp. v. Nevada Consol. Copper Co., 127 Misc.
71, 215 N.Y.S. 265 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1926); Mohr v. Sands, 44 Okla. 330, 133 P. 238 (1913);
Chrome Plating Co. v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 241 Wis. 554, 6 N.W.2d 692 (1942).
200. For example, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act provides that "any creditor that fails
to comply with a requirement imposed by the Act or this regulation is subject to civil liability
for actual and punitive damages in individual or class actions." 12 C.F.R. § 202.14(b) (1986).
Also, the federal rules for highway claims allow punitive damages to prevent violations of
hazardous materials regulations or motor carrier safety regulations. 50 Fed. Reg. 40,304
(1985); 49 C.F.R. § 386.71 (1985).
201. Conversely, although punitive damages are largely penal in nature, they serve other
purposes, such as deterring wrongdoers. See supra note 51. The fact that punitive damages
serve non-penal purposes may distinguish them from the "strictly penal" classification in the
Supreme Court's definition. Deterring others from wrongful conduct is a purpose aimed at
helping or protecting society, not at punishing a tortfeasor; therefore, deterrence is not
"penal."
202. For example, in Galef v. United States, 25 F.2d 134 (E.D.S.C. 1928), an American
plaintiff claimed and was awarded full damages for cargo lost on board a German lighter,
which was sunk by the United States government. The government had argued that under
German law (the law controlling where the wrong occurred), it was liable only for damages to
the degree of its own fault. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of South
Carolina held that American law (the forum's law) applied because the German rule violated
public policy and German law should not be applied to a United States vessel. Id. at 136.
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against foreign nations in which quasi-punitive damages were awarded
and enforced involved damages for violent death.2 °3 The State in which
the death occurred paid damages to the decedent's national government
and/or his heirs. Diplomatic settlements between nations for acts
against citizens of foreign States have also produced successful punitive
judgments which were paid to governments and heirs.2"
In all of these cases, the public policy in favor of compensating the
family or the property owner or of paying back the State for diplomatic
reasons conflicted with the policy against enforcing penal judgments of
foreign States. The former policy outweighed the latter because the judg-
ments were paid. Therefore, the stronger policy supports the idea that an
arbitral award of punitive damages should be enforced, even if it is con-
sidered penal.
Foreign States penalize wrongdoers to different degrees, depending
on the State's objectives and the public policies behind its laws.2 °0 Even
if the public policy of an arbitrator's punitive damage award is acceptable
to the enforcing State, it may not be enforceable if the State's courts can-
not administer or monitor the judgment.2"6 Whether a State will impose
Similarly, in Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. v. Campanhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileiro, 27
F.2d 1002 (E.D.N.Y. 1928), a collision occurred in Belgian waters. The respondent was
awarded higher damages by the American court than he would have received in a Belgian
court, solely because the suit was brought in the United States. Despite this fact, the district
court affirmed the judgment. Id. at 1004. Thus again, the forum's public policies were held to
be superior to the law governing the collision.
203. For example, one case involved the wife and children of an American missionary who
was murdered by a mob in China. The Chinese government paid a punitive judgment. See I
M. WHITEMAN, supra note 195, at 37-38 for a discussion of Reverend E.R. Beckman (United
States v. China) (1914) (unreported case). In another case, the Persian government paid an
American Vice Consul's wife a punitive judgment of $60,000 when her husband was murdered
by a mob in Teheran. See I M. WHITEMAN, supra note 195, at 136-38, for a discussion of the
case of Robert M. Imbrie (1912) (ureported case). Id. at 136-38. In a third case, involving
property damage rather than death, the U.S. Coast Guard intentionally sank a Canadian-
owned ship used by Americans for bootlegging liquor. The United States government was
fined and paid a punitive judgment of $25,000 as "amend[s] in respect of the wrong." See I M.
WHITEMAN, supra note 195, at 150-57, for a discussion of the case of United States Coast
Guard (1929) (unreported case).
204. See, ag., British Gov't v. Japanese Gov't (1863), French Gov't v. Japanese Gov't
(1868), British Gov't v. Sultan of Zanzibar (1888), French Gov't v. Dominican Republican
Gov't (1895) and U.S. Gov't v. China (1906). 1 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 195, at 722-30.
205. 2 M. HANCOCK, supra note 195, at 117-18.
206. For example, in Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904), a wrongful death
occurred in Mexico for which the plaintiff sued in federal district court in Texas. Mexican
laws (the law of the place of wrong) mandated that punitive damages be paid out over a long
time period, while American law (the law of the forum) required the defendant to pay in one
lump sum. During the enforcement proceeding, Justice Holmes conveyed the United States
Supreme Court's concern that American law might unjustly force the defendant to pay an
amount greater than that called for in Mexico. The Court decided that reducing liability in
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its own public policy on a foreign judgment is unpredictable. Therefore,
if one country's parochial public policies come head to head with puni-
tive damage purposes-punishment and deterrence---or with the United
States federal policy which grants arbitrators powers to award punitive
damages, the outcome is also unpredictable.
IV. CIVIL PUNISHMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY IN FOREIGN
SIGNATORY STATES
It will be helpful to look at several signatory States' domestic views
on punitive damages or other forms of civil punishment.2 °7 These views
may gauge whether countries with public policies unlike those in the
this way "would be to leave the whole matter to a mere guess." Id. at 128. The Texas court
had no way to supervise periodic payments, so the plaintiff's action for damages was dis-
missed. Id. at 129.
207. A full discussion of the public policy restrictions in nonsignatory countries to the Con-
vention is beyond the scope of this Comment. However, it is important to review the policies
of several foreign States with which United States businesspersons do business.
Every country which recognizes domestic or international arbitration as a substitute for
adjudication has a public policy exception which mirrors article V(2)(b) of the Convention. I.
SZASZY, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 182-83 (1967).
Szaszy cites civil code sections which confirm or enforce State courts' authority to refuse rec-
ognition and execution of foreign arbitral awards with a finding that those awards are contrary
to domestic public policy. Szaszy includes the States of Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Germany, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Poland,
Russia, Spain and Uruguay. Id. See also INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL AR-
BITRATION, [1976-1986] 1-11 Y.B. COM. ARB. for a discussion of the current civil codes of
each signatory State and some nonsignatory States. The Yearbook Commercial Arbitration
also explains how civil policies affect international and domestic arbitral awards. Some coun-
tries' rules further mandate that arbitral awards conform to domestic laws. Thus, in addition
to the ambiguities present in the judicial holdings on the Convention's exception, parties to an
international transaction should concern themselves with the potentially greater barriers to
enforcement of a punitive damage award in nonsignatory States.
A bilateral treaty between a signatory country and a nonsignatory country may aid en-
forcement of a foreign award. See supra note 126. Some of the countries mentioned below
have bilateral treaties, but further discussion of how these treaties and the Convention would
coexist is beyond the focus of this Comment.
Costa Rica, a nonsignatory jurisdiction, has signed but not ratified the Convention. In
Costa Rica, foreign awards are enforceable only if the judgment is enforceable in the country
of origin and if it does not contravene the public order (public policy). INTERNATIONAL
COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, NationalReports: Costa Rica [1978] 3 Y.B. COM.
ARB. 75. Venezuela also will not enforce any award in conflict with the public order. INTER-
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, National Reports: Venezuela [1978] 3
Y.B. COM. ARB. 149.
For defamation or false imprisonment, Brazilian law penalizes the wrongdoer by doubling
the actual fine imposed. If the defamation is republished, the penalty is also doubled. XI
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 8, at 87 (1973). For personal
injury, the Brazilian civil code allows compensation for losses which cannot be measured arith-
metically, usually considered non-pecuniary harm. In addition to medical costs, the tortfeasor
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United States will recognize and enforce an arbitral award granting an
must pay the plaintiff a sum in atonement equal to half the corresponding statutory penal fine
for the tort. This is doubled if the act results in a mutilation or disfiguration. Id.
In the People's Republic of China (PRC), with which Americans do a great deal of busi-
ness, businesspersons downplay the need for any resolution system-arbitration or adjudica-
tion-because it is presumed any dispute will be negotiated in conversations between the
parties. See I. RICHTER, supra note 29, at 198-200.
Formal dispute resolution ofjust about any dispute is coupled with "loss of face...
There is a common feeling that any dispute resolution process merely reflects the
political desires of the governing jurisdiction. Therefore, if binding arbitration is to
be agreed upon, the location and selection process are received with some suspicion.
Interview with David Noble, American Arbitration Association in Los Angeles (Mar. 17,
1986). All goodwill aside, if there is a problem with enforcement of an award executed in
China, a party must petition the People's Court of the PRC to enforce it. Yet "there has never
been a single case that had to be enforced by the People's Court. The Chinese foreign trade
and maritime enterprises are state-owned enterprises. They respect the [domestic] arbitration
awards." INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, National Reports:
People's Republic of China [1978] 3 Y.B. COM. ARB. 159. Foreign arbitral awards are treated
differently. Chinese enterprises and corporations will execute foreign awards "so long as they
are fair and not in violation of the Chinese laws and policies." Id. at 160. Would punitive
damages seem "fair" to a country like the PRC which shuns formal dispute resolution? Chi-
nese law does not recognize punitive damages, so they are certainly in violation of the Chinese
law. Where does this leave the contracting parties? Switzerland is a signatory to the Conve'n-
tion; nevertheless, only sixteen of its twenty-five cantons (as of 1977) signed an intercantonal
agreement unifying cantonal laws on domestic arbitration, which may always involve interna-
tional parties. The other nine have their own rules for arbitration. Id. at 181. Zurich, one of
the nine, hosts many arbitrations and allows annulment of an award when it constitutes a clear
violation of substantive law or of ordre public (public policy). Id. at 181, 202.
Algeria, not bound by Conventions, has Judicial Treaties with two of the Convention's
signatory states-Morocco and France. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION, National Reports: Algeria [1979] 4 Y.B. COM. ARB. 20 & n.l. In addition to a rule
that awards conform with Algerian public order, "the [Algerian] courts may be tempted to go
into the merits of the case, especially where no exequatur (leave [or recognition] for enforce-
ment) of the award has been obtained in its country of origin." Id. Could Algeria's judiciary
reexamine the merits of a punitive damage award and authorize the punishment of one of its
own citizens?
Daily, Americans execute many commercial transactions with Saudi Arabia; however, the
Saudis are nonsignatories to the Convention. Enforcing an award is difficult. First, the award
must be submitted to Saudi Arabia through diplomatic channels. It then will be transferred
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Office of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister's
Office decides whether to issue appropriate instructions for enforcement to the relevant execu-
tive arm of the government, or to refer the award to the Board of Grievances for confirmation
that it does not conflict with public or Saudi Arabian law. Id. at 168. What punitive damage
award could survive this strict scrutiny?
Other nonsignatory States have the public policy exception to enforcement in their Codes
of Civil Procedure. Among these are Argentina, Honduras, Paraguay, Uruguay, Iran, Iraq
and Libya. See I. SZASZY, supra, at 182-83. (It may be noted some of these transact very little
business lately with the United States.) In the least, a party holding an international arbitral
punitive damage award must assume enforcement procedures will be complicated and prob-
lematic. The public policies behind punitive damages, especially the civil punishment of a
foreign State's citizen or corporation bring the award dangerously close to national morality
and justice.
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American penalty. States which employ civil punishment would most
likely recognize and enforce an arbitral award which civilly punishes a
citizen with punitive damages. The States embracing public policies
which do not recognize civil punishment will be more likely to review the
merits of an award presented for enforcement and hold that the award
violates public policy.2" 8 Any general conflict between the enforcing
State's public policy and the award, coupled with the Convention's pub-
lic policy exception to enforcement, potentially arms an unsuccessful
party with a valid excuse to ignore an international punitive damage
award.
As noted above, exemplary (punitive) damages are well-known to
British common law. In New Zealand and England, they have been
awarded for false imprisonment by a government official.2"9 In New
Zealand they have also been awarded for the tortious wrongs of defama-
tion, especially with proof of malice on the part of the defamer.2"0 They
have also been awarded for malicious prosecution,2" conspiracy, 212 tres-
208. Countries which find the concept of civil punishment or the purposes of punitive dam-
ages offensive may not normally punish civilly. Moreover, they would certainly reject another
State's decision to civilly punish its citizens by assessing money damages against those citizens.
The offended foreign State might, therefore, find a punitive damage judgment or award against
public policy for one of several reasons. First, the mere fact that an action has been brought
against a person or a business for fraud or some other opprobrious conduct might mar that
person's reputation in the business community. Then that person is "punished" for his pub-
licly-reported breach merely by being forced to compensate the injured party. Enforcing extra
money damages would, in a sense, be redundant. Second, deterring potential wrongdoers
might not be part of a country's legal system. If there are no national policies designed to
deter, the punitive damage purpose of deterrence will be inapplicable to a foreign State's citi-
zens. The award will not have the same effect on that State's citizens as it would on American
citizens; in fact, the award may have no effect at all on parties outside the arbitration. Thus, an
enforcing court may nullify an award because its own national policies defeat the American
purposes behind punitive damages. Third, an enforcing court may simply take offense at an
arbitrator's award which imposes foreign laws or policies on the enforcing State's citizens. In
this situation, national sovereignty and pride in one's own laws may outweigh international
cooperation, and thus emasculate punitive damage awards. An enforcing court could use these
reasons or any number of others to defeat a punitive award which is contrary to the foreign
State's public policies against civil punishment within its boundaries.
209. Rookes v. Bernard, 1964 App. Cas. 1129; see supra notes 62-65 and accompanying
text. See also Ryan, Civil Punishment of the Uncivil: The Nature and Scope of Exemplary
Damages in New Zealand, 5 AUCKLAND U.L. REV. 53 (1984).
210. Broome v. Cassels, Ltd., 1972 App. Cas. 1027 (grave libels perpetuated deliberately
and without regard to truth by book publishers).
211. M'Comb v. Low, [1873] 1 N.Z. Jur. 49; Taylor v. Beere, 1982 1 N.Z.L.R. 81
(C.A.N.Z.).
212. Harding v. Kummer, 1983 N.Z. Recent Law 308 (H.C.); O'Boyle v. Liggett, 1983
N.Z. Recent Law 117 (H.C.).
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pass,2 13 negligence,2 14 breach of promise of marriage215 and nuisance.21 6
Any of these actions could arise out of a breach of contract.21 7 In an
action solely for breach of contract, the New Zealand courts have incon-
sistently decided whether punitive damages may be awarded.218 In Eng-
land, the House of Lords has disallowed them.219 Australia's High
Court and Canadian courts have also awarded punitive damages for
defamation.220
Because the British legal system is familiar with civil punishment by
damages in excess of compensation, it would seem that a foreign punitive
damage award would be enforced in the United Kingdom. However,
Professor Ronald H. Graveson, author of Conflict ofLaws 22 1 and general
editor of Problems in Private International Law, 222 believes otherwise.
He states:
A foreign (e.g. U.S.) award of punitive damages would not be
enforced in England because it would be regarded as penal, and
foreign criminal law is not enforced.... I know of no cases
dealing with the point on enforcing arbitral awards, but I think
the courts would follow the same principle. Whether this is
right or wrong is a different point.223
213. Donselaar v. Donselaar, 1982 N.Z. Recent Law 230 (C.A.); Percy v. Le Heux, Unre-
ported, High Court Christchurch, Feb. 12, 1982. See Ryan, supra note 209, at 53 n.96.
214. Furniss v. Fitchett, 1958 N.Z.L.R. 396.
215. A v. B, 1974 1 N.Z.L.R. 673.
216. Riley v. Amalgamated Brick & Pipe Co. (Wellington) Ltd., 1982 N.Z. Recent Law 270
(H.C.).
217. Defamation, trespass and nuisance, all intentional torts, could arise out of a contrac-
tual relation between two businesspersons. This might happen when one defames the other,
where one trespasses in an unauthorized area and causes property damage, or where activity of
one landowner is a nuisance to the adjoining landowner with whom he has a business contract
for some related enterprise. Almost any contract could lead to malicious prosecution, if rela-
tions sour and one party brings a frivolous law suit.
Finally, a conspiracy to intimidate an oil-tanker driver who defied his union might arise
out of an employee-employer contract.
218. Furniss v. Fitchett, 1958 N.Z.L.R. 396; Taylor v. Beere, 1982 1 N.Z.L.R. 81; see also
1982 N.Z. Recent Law 269 (C.A.).
219. Addis v. Gramophone Co., 1909 App. Cas. 488 (manager's action for damages due to
alleged wrongful dismissal from employment). See supra text accompanying notes 62-63 for a
discussion of Addis.
220. Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons, Ltd., 117 C.L.R. 118 (Austl. 1966); Paragon Properties
Ltd. v. Magna Invest. Ltd., 1972 24 D.L.R.3d 156 (S.C.R.); McElroy v. Cowper-Smith &
Woodman, 1967 62 D.L.R.2d 65 (S.C.R.).
221. See R. GRAVESON, CONFLICT OF LAWS: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed.
1974).
222. See R. GRAVESON, PROBLEMS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1978).
223. Letter from Professor Ronald Graveson to Karen Tolson (May 3, 1986) (copy on file
at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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If punitive damages are treated as civil punishment, then a foreign
punitive award would not disrupt the domestic British system for punish-
ment because the British courts currently punish with punitive damages.
The award also would not violate any basic international notions of jus-
tice because the concept of pecuniary punishment is ancient and univer-
sal. 24 However, if Professor Graveson is correct and punitive damages
are viewed by some English courts as an aspect of criminal law, then
such penal judgments do upset basic universal notions that only a sover-
eign can punish its own citizens.
Although punitive damages are penal because they are meant to
punish according to public policy, they are not penal and unenforceable
in the sense that they are criminal sanctions. Because punitive damages
are not considered criminal punishment in the United States,225 they
should not be considered so outside the United States.
Other countries preferring not to use punitive damages punish with
other forms of monetary damages which exceed compensation. For ex-
ample, Norway allows an injured victim damages for non-pecuniary
harm regardless of whether the injury is punishable.226 Moreover, Nor-
wegian law authorizes damages in excess of compensation as a penalty in
cases of violation of sexual integrity and honor, infringement of liberty
and invasion of privacy.227 Two factors go into the determination of the
amount awarded: the defendant's financial situation and the gravity of
the act committed.228
The USSR and Poland are signatories to the Convention.229 Social-
ist legal systems recognize multiple damages as punishment. In the
USSR, a worker or employee who is "specially" responsible for the "loss,
destruction or waste of raw materials, partially manufactured goods [or]
the completed products of the business" is liable under Soviet labor law
for five times the amount of loss. 230 If cattle are lost, the employee is
liable for three times the amount of injury.231 On a collective farm, a
member who wrongfully appropriates an animal must pay back one and
a half times the animal's purchase price, as determined by the state.232
224. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5. Therefore, civil penalties can never violate a
nation's most "basic notions of morality and justice."
225. Punitive damages are part of tort and contract law, not part of criminal law. See supra
notes 51-53.
226. XI INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 10, at 86 (1981).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See supra note 19.
230. XI INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 8, at 108 (1973).
231. Id. See supra text accompanying note 1.
232. XI INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 8, at 108 (1973).
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Finally, a tortfeasor who damages forestry may be liable to pay ten times
the amount of the loss.
233
France has similar laws. For example, a judgment debtor who re-
fuses to comply with the terms of his civil punishment is subject to a
coercive penalty called the astreinte.234 The debtor must pay the creditor
"a certain sum for every infraction of a prohibitory judgment or for every
day of non-compliance with a judgment decreeing performance of an
act. '2 35 The French courts developed this civil penalty to aid enforce-
ment of non-monetary judgments, although it has been used to aid execu-
tion of monetary judgments. 236 As with civil penalties in Norway, the
French courts determine the penalty amount after considering the grav-
ity of the debtor's fault and the debtor's financial circumstances.237
Several other signatory States have adopted a civil penalty similar to
the astreinte. For example, Egypt and the Swiss Canton Geneva have
adopted the astreinte, and the Netherlands employs a punishment like
the astreinte called the dwangsom.238
Private-law penalties are also allowed in the Philippines "by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, tem-
perate, liquidated, or compensatory damages. 2 39 A tortfeasor may also
need to pay exemplary damages if he has committed gross negligence.240
Conversely, one example of a signatory nation which does not rec-
ognize punitive damages is Austria. Dr. Werner Melis, for the Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance, writes:
[N]o such case [involving punitive damages] has gone before an
Austrian Court so far.
The legal institute of punitive damages does not exist in
the Austrian legal system and arbitrators are, therefore, also
not entitled to award such punitive damages.
In view of this it is difficult to predict the findings on [sic]
an Austrian Court if a foreign award in which punitive dam-
ages are granted should be enforced in Austria. In my personal
opinion I think that the result might to a certain degree also
depend on the quantum. I could imagine that the public policy
issue would not be raised if the quantum of the punitive dam-
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 109 & n.913.
237. Id. at 111.
238. Id. at 111, 114.
239. Id. at 106 (quoting the PHILIPPINE CIv. CODE (art. 2229)).
240. Id.
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ages would be considered as reasonable and could also be ar-
gued under other legal aspects.z41
Countries which punish civilly, such as those above, use those penal-
ties to punish judgment debtors when they fail to comply with court
awards and tortfeasors who fail to comply with "the public good." All
these penalties may also deter other wrongdoers from the same conduct,
because others are aware of the State's penalties. Yet deterrence is not
the main objective of these penalties; punishment is. Thus, these signa-
tory States, bound by the Convention to enforce foreign awards which do
not violate the State's public policy, should not refuse enforcement of a
punitive damage award which enlists civil penalties similar to the State's
own laws.
V. PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFORM PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
A. The Proper Definition of Public Policy Under the Convention
The "public policy" exception to enforcement is the Convention's
most controversial clause because the varying definitions of the Article
V(2) (b) language necessarily leave contracting parties in the dark as to
whether their assets will be subject to or insulated from an international
arbitrator's award. This Comment has illustrated that parties improp-
erly claim the exception as a "safety valve" or a "catch-all" excuse by
which they can delay or avoid compliance with an award.
The Convention's purpose is to create uniform enforcement proce-
dures which will expedite compliance with international arbitration
awards.242 This objective supports the proposition that the public policy
in Article V is meant solely to denote international public policy.
243
Thus, a national enforcing court should heed an objecting party's pro-
tests only when they properly invoke principles of "international public
policy." That is, public policy should only block enforcement when the
241. Letter from Dr. Werner Melis, Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen
Wirtschaft (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), Vienna, Austria, to Karen Tolson
(Apr. 4, 1986) (copy on fie at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
242. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985),
the United States Supreme Court stated:
The utility of the Convention in promoting the process of international commercial
arbitration depends upon the willingness of national courts to let go of matters they
normally would think of as their own. Doubtless, Congress may specify categories of
claims it wishes to reserve for decision by our own courts without contravening this
Nation's obligations under the Convention. But we decline to subvert the spirit of
the United States' accession to the Convention by recognizing subject-matter excep-
tions where Congress has not expressly directed the courts to do so.
Id. at 3360 n.21.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 139-41.
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arbitration process or the resulting award violates critical procedural
rights involving impartiality, fairness or legality.
Countries will continue to inconsistently apply the Convention's in-
tended uniform procedures if the defenses to enforcement are not limited
to these principles. Therefore, this Comment proposes three alternative
methods to resolve confusion about what constitutes public policy under
the Convention: (1) an amendment to the Convention; (2) a uniform
test courts could apply to any Article V(2)(b) claim for nonenforcement;
and (3) specific language parties could include in their international arbi-
tration agreements.
B. Amendment to the Convention
A short statement amending the Convention would eliminate most
domestic public policy defenses under Article V(2)(b), yet would leave
some discretion to the enforcing national court. The amendment should
read:
AMENDMENT TO THE CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
The term "public policy" in Article V(2)(b) of this Con-
vention is defined as that policy which internationally ensures
(1) reasonably impartial arbitrators; (2) fair procedures includ-
ing proper notice and the ability to present one's case; and (3)
absence of illegality in the arbitral process and award.
Three qualities will make this amendment workable and acceptable
to foreign nations. First, this definition excludes a court's unwarranted
search into the merits of an award during an enforcement action unless it
finds a critical procedural violation. The court will necessarily have to
respect the fact-finding in the arbitral process, and its review will neces-
sarily be more cursory than substantive. Therefore, the Convention lan-
guage preserves the integrity of international commercial arbitration as a
substitute for adjudication.
Second, the definition mandates that the arbitrator alone make all
decisions about how to apply the substantive law chosen by the parties to
the situation presented. An enforcing State's court is not free to ignore
or change the determination and impose its own policies in the enforce-
ment process. This serves the arbitral goal of predictability in interna-
tional dispute resolution because the substantive law of the enforcing
State remains excluded from the trier of fact's determination.
Third, the definition incorporates unobjectionable, internationally-
accepted principles-impartiality, fairness and legality-which are al-
INT'L ARBITRATION AWARDS
ready supposed to accompany the arbitral process worldwide. The
amendment's goals are universal, and do touch the enforcing State's most
basic notions of morality and justice. Thus, an agreement to amend the
Convention among the sixty or so nations which have signed the Conven-
tion should not be difficult. In fact, a majority of signatories would wel-
come a universal definition of public policy.
C. A Judicial Test for Article V(2)(b) "Public Policy"
The second alternative this Comment proposes is a uniform test an
enforcing court could apply to any claim of an Article V public policy
violation. The test incorporates the standards of the proposed amend-
ment in a question:
Do the arbitration procedures or the terms of the arbitral
award violate that public policy which internationally ensures
(1) reasonably impartial arbitrator(s); (2) fair procedures in-
cluding proper notice and the ability to present one's case; and
(3) absence of illegality in the arbitral process and award?
Foreign courts would approve of the test for the same reasons they would
agree with the language in the amendment. Additionally, since the Con-
vention is a multilateral treaty and a misinterpretation of a multilateral
treaty is a violation of international law, the International Court of Jus-
tice has jurisdiction over a case arising out of the misinterpretation. 244
The International Court of Justice could therefore overturn any court's
decision not to properly apply a uniform, generally-accepted test for
treaty interpretation.
Obtaining seventy nations' agreement to ratify the proposed amend-
ment or to apply the proposed test in every appropriate situation is ad-
mittedly no small task. However, one of the international arbitration
conventions held annually under various auspices could devote serious
effort to enlisting support for this proposal.2 45 The confusion about the
public policy exception justifies the effort required because the Conven-
tion's success in the future depends upon uniform application of its
provisions.
D. Drafting the Arbitration Agreement Language
Realistically, there may be little contracting parties can do to
244. See supra note 177 for a discussion of the International Court of Justice's jurisdiction.
245. For example, one convention this year, called the International Arbitration Congress,
was held by the International Council for Commercial Arbitration in New York City, May 6-
9, 1986. The International Bar Association, ICC and ICSID hosted a Conference in San Fran-
cisco, California on September 11-12, 1986.
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change the way enforcing courts interpret and apply the Convention's
current public policy exception. After an international arbitrator applies
the parties' contractual choice of substantive law to a fact situation and a
national court confirms the award, the only role parties play in the en-
forcing process is to submit the award to the enforcing court for review.
Yet under universally-accepted freedom of contract principles, a contract
between parties embodies the agreement by which their dispute is gov-
erned. If a court truly honors contract terms which limit an enforcing
court's power to review the arbitral award, the court is bound to limit its
review. To create this possible scenario, this Comment proposes that
contracting parties include the following language in their arbitration
agreements:
The parties to this contract agree that they shall comply
with the arbitral award decided under the substantive law gov-
erning this contract. To further this goal, the parties agree that
the following provisions apply in a proceeding for enforcement
of the arbitral award:
(1) Neither party will claim Article V(2)(b) of the 1958
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards as a defense to enforcement unless the arbitra-
tor's decision violates international public policy. International
public policy is defined in this agreement as that public policy
which internationally ensures (a) reasonably impartial arbitra-
tor(s); (b) fair procedures including proper notice and the abil-
ity to present one's case; and (c) absence of illegality in the
arbitral process and award.
(2) An enforcing court is not authorized to review the
merits of an award arbitrated under this arbitration agreement.
The court is only authorized to review the procedures of the
arbitration to ensure the arbitration process did not violate that
public policy which internationally ensures (a) reasonably im-
partial arbitrator(s); (b) fair procedures including proper notice
and the ability to present one's case; and (c) absence of illegality
in the arbitral process and award.
Although some enforcing courts could choose to ignore the parties'
limits on review and, thereby, the notion of freedom of contract, other
enforcing courts would respect the parties' agreement and restrict the
review to the notions of fairness and legality. Thus, this language may
guarantee the parties some predictability in their agreement to arbitrate.
Because predictability is one of the greatest advantages to participating in
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international arbitration, any contractual provisions which further that
goal should be included in arbitration agreements whenever possible.
The contracting parties may also include language in their agree-
ment which specifically states that punitive damages may be awarded
against a party under the chosen substantive law. Another clause might
state the parties specifically agree to comply with any punitive damage
award, even if the award is considered a penalty in the foreign State
where the debtor has assets. These agreements not only could help to
make enforcement proceedings run more smoothly and make compliance
more predictable, but the clauses would also deter parties from breaching
the contract or committing tortious acts, which may lead to large puni-
tive damage awards.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has analyzed the problems inherent in enforcing an
international arbitral award which includes punitive damages. Recent
United States federal case law authorizes domestic arbitrators to decide
punitive damage issues, and therefore, international arbitrators may de-
cide punitive damage issues when they are claimed by a party in an inter-
national contractual dispute governed by United States law. A foreign
State's court presented with a punitive damage award in an enforcement
proceeding may decide the State cannot accept the American policies
behind punitive damages. It may find domestic public policy limitations
which defeat the award. Then the enforcing court is at liberty to frus-
trate enforcement by using Article V(2)(b) of the Convention. At pres-
ent, Article V(2)(b) is interpreted inconsistently in the courts of different
nations. These interpretations allow a court to defeat a valid arbitral
award by contrasting the substantive law applied in the award with do-
mestic, not international, public policy.
Some foreign States which are familiar with the idea of civil punish-
ment or which rarely apply the rule rendering as void one State's penal
judgment against another State's citizens may make the enforcement pro-
cess somewhat easier; yet, countries with their own staid interpretations
of public policy or strict policies on national sovereignty may block en-
forcement at all costs. Therefore, this Comment has proposed an amend-
ment to the Convention, a uniform test for enforcing courts to apply to
arbitral awards and arbitration agreement language which may limit an
enforcing court's review of a valid award. All three proposals use as a
basis the internationally accepted guarantees or "public policies" of im-
partial arbitration, fair procedures and legality in the arbitral process and
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award. All three proposals intend to ensure that a party trying to avoid a
punitive damage award will be unsuccessful.
This Comment urges that either the amendment to the Convention
or the test for courts which apply Article V(2)(b) of the Convention be
adopted at the next international arbitration convention as the standard
for a successful defense to enforcement of an arbitral award including
punitive damages. As the public policy exception is used now, it could
defeat almost any award which conflicts with any domestic public policy
of the State in which the award must be enforced. Therefore, a uniform
standard for applying the public policy exception is critical to the inter-
national acceptance of arbitration as a mechanism for alternative dispute
resolution.
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